

an solas


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Irish Workers Group

**FOR THE
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EDITORIALS

1. THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNE OF 1956

TEN YEARS AGO THIS AUTUMN STALINISM SHOWED THAT IT WAS STILL VERY MUCH ALIVE, that it had not been buried either with Stalin or at the 20th Congress -- and that those who said it had were wishful fools or liars. The Hungarian workers

rose for socialist democracy, an end to the grinding economic regime of parasitic stalinism, and in favour of national liberation from the oppression of the Russian bureaucracy and they were mercilessly crushed by the might of the Soviet Union. It was shown decisively that "de-Stalinisation" was a change of gears, an adjustment of tension and tempo - but in no sense a basic change. The monster was still sucking blood and had sharp and deadly teeth to defend its suckers.

Ten years is too short a time for a detailed re-telling of the story here to be necessary; but we will best honour the proletarian martyrs of 1956 by briefly examining the lessons of their struggle.

CAPITALIST HYPOCRISY

We have seen the contributions of Capitalism's ad-men on this anniversary: pious breast-beating, mixed with assurances that Hungary is far better off today. They were willing and eager to scream about the rape of Hungary, as they still do, reaping the anti-socialist propaganda harvest of their lives - but the capitalists themselves, behind their hypocrisy, were just as concerned as the Stalinists that on no account should a democratic workers' state, freed from the stifling and disfiguring scab of Stalinism, be allowed to emerge. A Titoite Yugoslavia is one thing: self assertion by the armed masses. a different and deadly thing. No less than the Bureaucracy did they fear the Hungarian mass movement, and for the same reason.

On the day before the fighting began Dulles, then US Secretary of State, openly defended the legality of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. During the bloodbath the New York Times reported the US Government as openly opposed to the revolt, and embarrassed by it. They had let the Russians know in the most diplomatic language that they would 'defend' Berlin and Austria -- but as for Hungary ... Dulles had already given the line on that. The Hungarian masses were 'left to their fate'; to the capitalists they were only useful as propaganda - and for this purpose the only good revolution was a crushed revolution.

We know the story of Hungary. The centuries-long struggle against both Austria and Russia for national emancipation; a Bolshevik Government, the first Hungarian Commune, in 1919, put down in blood by the White counter-revolution; the Horthy years with the Hapsburg admiral at the head of the reaction; the war in alliance with Germany and the aftermath of defeat, with Hungary as the battleground; the Russian occupation which had no use for the class differentiation of the days of Lenin and Trotsky: next, Hungary part of the

Soviet sphere of influence as recognised by the Great Power Conferences, real power in the hands of the Russian army, and the CP with ample time to demonstrate the possibility of a "peaceful revolution" -- provided you have first broken the back of the state, or someone has; the years of Rakosi's terror, vented first against the honest communists who found reality under the extended fiat of Stalin nearer to Horthy's barbarism than to any kind of socialism, who resisted or resented the conception of the satellite states as milch-cows for the Russian economy; and then the attempt to ease the tension of the police terror that for years had ruled from Siberia to central Germany - an attempt which finally got out of hand for the bureaucracy and led to the Hungarian explosion.

When Stalin's crimes - a portion of them - were denounced by his accomplices and successors, the bureaucracy shook to its foundations. In Hungary critical voices emerged, at first among the intellectuals and students. Laslo Rajk was now rehabilitated. Leader of the war-time underground CP who later resisted the Stalinist corruption, he was hanged in 1949 after confessing to fantastic crimes at one of the show trials which took place throughout E. Europe at that time, clearly modelled on the Moscow trials of the thirties. Over a quarter of a million workers and students marched behind his disinterred bones, in a resurgence of popular feeling comparable to the giant funeral of O'Donovan Rossa in 1915. Soon the workers were out in the streets, arguing, discussing, while the erstwhile tyrants hesitated to resort to repression that might exacerbate the situation. When the stiff-necked Gero clique did finally make up their minds it was too late.

THE SYMBOLS COME DOWN

A programme of democratic demands was drawn up: withdrawal of Russian troops; an end to compulsory production norms; workers' control -- industrial and political; a ceiling on the salaries of managers and technicians, as Bolshevnik Russia had known. When the AVO (the hated political police) opened fire on students who demanded that this programme be broadcast over the radio it sparked off a series of pitched battles. After a week of bitter fighting against tanks and machine guns, the workers controlled Budapest: the Russian army was withdrawn. Workers' councils organised the means of life. Popular confidence swelled and grew, and took the form of cleansing the streets of Budapest of the symbols of Stalinism. Hammers and sickles which had come to represent tyranny were torn down; the proliferate statuary of the State crashed to the ground. The elation and solidarity of proletarian freedom was everywhere. A new government emerged, composed of members of the CP who had been in disfavour at various times, led by Nagy and Maleter.

As later events, including developments in Hungary itself have shown, liberalisation was possible without loss to the bureau-

-cracy; and the Polish October 1956, which had acted as a spur to the Hungarians, showed that a bending to pressure, controlled by a section of the bureaucracy, was also acceptable. But the crime of the Hungarians was that they had asserted their freedom arms in hand. This was the danger, the fuse to the powder keg. Real power wasn't in the hands of the Nagy government, but was held by the workers and students. The Russians had retired, but they were far from satisfied.

Nagy announced the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. And the opportune moment arrived for the Russians to return, when the English-French-Israeli invasion of Suez set the example in the slaughter of the people of Port Said. A new onslaught against the Budapest workers was now made so much easier. A new army crossed the border, unaffected by the spirit of Budapest, set up a 'provisional' Government under Janos Kadar, hitherto a supporter of Nagy. Now the 'Red' army had the most modern tanks, and they retook Budapest after heavy fighting with great casualties for the rebels -- the most determined of whom were concentrated in the workers' areas such as Csepel and Dunapentele. Thus the armed resistance was broken; but for weeks after the workers held out in the slow grinding battle of a general strike.

The irony of the situation emerged when workers mounted a bust of Lenin on their barricade to taunt the advancing Russians! But this was the natural place for even a statue of Lenin in the Budapest of 1956. It was as if some force of historic truth acted through the confused people who put it there, to ensure that 'Lenin' was seen in his rightful place - with the proletarian insurgents.....

STALINIST LIES

The Stalinists still say it was a fascist counter-revolution; and still they find believers, who are surely credulous to believe in a fascist general strike! Of course there were fascists. Some had found good jobs terrorising workers as members of the AVO -- these the workers dealt with mercilessly, as they dealt with other known Stalinist terrorists. The struggle was conducted by the proletariat with proletarian weapons: the general strike; the councils of workers deputies; and armed struggle - albeit with pityably poor arms against tanks. The Stalinist lies were exposed when the Daily Worker's Budapest correspondent, Peter Fryer, defended the Hungarian workers from the shameless hired hacks of their murderers.

The workers burnt only the symbols of 'communism' -- its real meaning rose, phoenix-like, in their programme: not to restore Capitalism or the landlords, but to retain nationalised property cleansed of the bureaucracy and privilege which were the social basis of the terror. There was some feeling for restoring the land to the smallholders who had been forcibly collectivised

in the barbarous Stalinist manner. But the big landlords, including the Catholic Church, who owned half of all Hungary until Nagy's agrarian reform after the war, would have needed a better army than that which the workers had defeated either to regain possession or restore their rule.

It must be admitted that the situation was fluid and many possibilities existed: only a struggle between different tendencies would have decided the outcome. Between the withdrawal of the first Russian army and the final suppression a Government essentially centrist balanced on top of the workers' councils. Its perspective was one of consolidation of limited gains rather than of extending the revolution to spread the fire to the heart of the bureaucratic power - Russia.

ILLUSIONS SHATTERED

The great vacuum was the absence of any pre-ordered party which could raise the magnificent spontaneous action of the masses to a higher level of effectiveness, such as was imparted in 1917 by the Bolshevik Party. Hungary shattered a lot of illusions: in Stalinism for its sincere adherents and fellow-travellers; and in an easy non-revolutionary self-reform by the bureaucracy for some 'revolutionary marxists' who had given way to wishful thinking. The debilitating negative proof of defeat showed ^{that} those who had striven to maintain the conception of the Lenin-type Bolshevik party after the degeneration of the Comintern were correct, and no less correct in regard to the anti-bureaucratic revolution in the East as to the anti-capitalist revolution in the West.

The 10th Anniversary finds the Stalinist world split down the middle, its 'monolithic' unity rent by the narrow national interests of the Chinese and Soviet bureaucracies. E. European and Russian standards have risen, the terror has been relaxed - but still the congenital crisis of Stalinism continues, still ~~this regime~~ of oppression of the working class and betrayal of socialism must disguise itself with 'socialist' camouflage; it remains unsettled and the rulers need gimmicks and 'experiments' -- every gimmick and every sort of experiment to ward off the one solution - the initiative of the masses of the workers.

After Berlin in 1953, Hungary was the first great lightning flash of the coming revolution of the workers in the stalinist states. The Hungarian workers were isolated and they were crushed, and the re-inforcements for this came from the heart of Russia. But tomorrow, when the rumblings in Russia itself explode in the mass movement of the workers to reclaim the power to control their own lives - where will the bureaucrats get re-inforcements from then? When the Russian workers move decisively no power on earth will accomplish what Krushchev's tanks did in Budapest in November 1956.

2. FARMERS ON THE MOVE

The recent picket and mass demonstrations by the farmers indicate the ferment in Irish agriculture. In many ways it is more a death agony than a ferment. Fianna Fail, whose backbone (though not its head) has long been the small and medium sized farmers, has donned the black hood worn by the old exterminators of the Irish peasants. The bourgeoisie's policy is to sink into the capitalist 'common' market - thereby accepting that the blind fluctuations of capitalism will determine the economic life of Ireland. The earlier feeble attempts by the capitalists to escape the consequences of their own world system and industrialise result in the shedding of even the hollow pretence of state intervention for the protection of the people of Ireland. With the Free Trade Agreement Lemass & Co. accepted that in ten years all barriers against the monopolistic giants of Britain will disappear from Irish industry. But even before that Britain and her satellite will have joined the Common Market. And though they got concessions from Britain on agriculture in return, the cold winds will later blow back from Britain and Europe in the agricultural areas of Ireland also.

In the ten years from '55 to '65 the agricultural population declined by over 100,000; in the last year it dropped at least a further 7,000. Sinn Fein has estimated that the Second Programme was designed to drive ten times that number off the land, which will amount to nothing less than a stampede in the full ripening of the Fianna Fail policy. The long term policy of the government is to foster large scale farms, of which it has been estimated that less than 200 acres will not be viable. Their policy - if a pathetic hope can be so called - for industry is for massive foreign investment ... after the marriage to the Common Market. Unfortunately for the thousands driven off the land, there will be a large gap (perhaps very large) between the denuding of the land of people and availability of jobs in the promised industry. The emigration ships, as always, will have to level off the difference.

FALL IN PRICES

The Government's policy was spotlighted by the resignation of General Costello from Erin Foods because the government refused sufficient money to develop this enterprise (and there are rumours that it may be sold); on it rested the fondest hopes of counteracting depopulation by encouraging intensive co-operative farming, aided by canning and drying plants set up by the government.

This is the background to the current situation. Farm incomes have declined; added to this was the drying up and shutting off

this summer of the continental beef market. The effects of the Common Market tariffs argue for the government's policy of entry -- but still only the big mechanised ranches will benefit, leaving the harsh logic of capitalism to deal with the masses of small farmers. The formerly favoured position of Ireland vis a vis the British market has been progressively destroyed by the EFTA agreements, and the effects of this have not been greatly alleviated by the agricultural clauses of the AFTA. Many farmers, having fallen into debt with the banks to finance their cattle production, end up with little or no return, deprived by the fall in prices. Recently the Second Programme stipulated an annual cow increase of 75,000 - but the limitations of the capitalist market system strangle developments at even the present level. So much for capitalist planning!


Naturally the hardest hit, and least able to bear the blow is the small farmer. Three quarters of all farms are under 50 acres, many a great deal smaller - though it is estimated that the minimum requirement for a decent living is 100 acres: 100,000 farmers get less than £5 a week! It is the big 25%, owning 60% of the land, who will benefit from the Common Market, and who can survive the crises. In the long run they benefit also from the ruination of the small independent farmer. There are always capitalists to benefit from the apparently arbitrary cruelty of the system.

FALSE 'FRIENDS'

The farmers complain of Government indifference to their plight. They point out that a plan for a meat marketing board to regularise the sale of meat, submitted by the NFA to the government in January '64, has been ignored. As Deasy said: "They have a doctrinaire position that the capital investment of private enterprise in the Irish fresh meat industry must take absolute priority over the thousands of producers of Irish cattle - both large and small". Statements like this do a power of good for the big farmers' image, helping to perpetuate the idea of big and small farmers' unity - helping to keep the ranchers in the NFA leadership, papering over the antagonisms within the NFA.

In fact, the small farmer will get short shrift from the ranchers, the capitalist farmers and exploiters of labour, in country as in town. Only the proletariat, having taken power and established a planned economy, with control over the pressures which are now exterminating the small farmer, can come to his aid, can have sympathy with him as being similarly vulnerable, equally hard-working. But the proletariat must first strive to win the leadership of the small farmers in an alliance against the bourgeoisie and Imperialism.

This effort demands a correct attitude towards the farmers. For though the agricultural labourer is a proletarian like the factory



workers must reply with the slogan: "Show us your books; we demand control over the fixing of prices." They can thus prove to the farmers that it is not high wages that cause high prices ... but the exorbitant profits of the big capitalists and merchants, coupled with the wasteful anarchy of capitalist production.

As Marxists we remain convinced that only large scale agriculture can be economically effective, can relieve the farming population of their deadly grinding labour and provide decent standards all round. Only state ownership and collective farming is the long-term solution. But this can come about only with the voluntary agreement of the the small farmers: the revolutionary proletariat, adhering to the views of Engels and of the pre-Stalin Bolsheviks, guarantee that the small farmer will remain owner of his plot of land as long as he himself thinks it necessary or possible. We reject the forcible collectivisation of the peasants and denounce the Stalinist record as anti-socialist and dictated neither by the interests of the working class nor of the farmers but by the interests of the bureaucracy. (We can observe in passing that the position of the peasant under a democratic workers state would be a lot more secure than it is at the moment under Fianna Fail.)

The proletariat in power can have only fraternal concern and friendship for the small farmer in their common struggle for a better life: the breaking up of the capitalist state signifies the beginning of the end for all exploitative relations. The proletariat will exploit no-one, least of all the small farmer.

In the cities of England, the great immigrant lakes of Ireland are as ever being fed from the swelling river of farmers driven from the land. These too must be drawn into the common struggle. The Irish Workers Group must answer the questions of the first-generation proletarians; we must forge and weld the experiences which Imperialism and Irish Capitalism imposes on our people into weapons to strike back at our oppressors.

LESSONS OF THE INDONESIAN TRAGEDY

By SEAN REED.

ON THE 23rd OF MAY 1965, THE 45th ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY of Indonesia (PKI), President Sukarno delivered a speech in which he paid homage to Party chairman D.N.Aidit as the "fortress of Indonesia" and urged the Party to "go onward, onward, onward; never retreat!" Party membership stood at three million, the Young Communist League (Pemuda Rakjat) was three million strong; there were twenty million sympathisers. Pro-Chinese papers in Europe were printing photographs of leading members of the PKI under the caption "Preparing for Power". With the exception of a few Marxist (ie Trotskyist) voices the world seemed to believe that the PKI was in a position of unassailable strength and moving slowly towards eventual power.

Six months later, Aidit was presumed dead; Communist activities were banned; perhaps as many as one million party members and sympathisers were killed. (Estimates vary widely, but Sukarno himself admitted that at least 87,000 had been murdered -- Reuter, Washington Post 16.1.66). Larger numbers were under arrest.

This extraordinary turn in the situation can be traced to the events of the night of the 30th September 1965. Six senior generals were abducted and assassinated in the course of an attempted coup d'etat by the Communist People's Youth and the women's organisation GERWANI.

The whole truth about the "September 30th affair" may never be known; but it seems established that Aidit disappeared from Jakarta on Sept. 29th, and that the PKI newspaper, Harian Rakjat, endorsed the coup editorially in its last issue, on the morning of October 2nd.

Aidit, who was known to have been deeply affected by the "putschist" and "adventurist" line of the PKI in the period of the "Madian incidents", had advised his party for years to be patient. He wished at any cost to stick with the Sukarno group representing the so-called national bourgeoisie. Consequently the PKI followed the policy of a "united national front". They accepted Sukarno's partial suspension of democratic freedoms. They joined a coalition government which included the ultra reactionary head of the army.

This policy was based on a false characterisation of the nature of the state apparatus, formulated as follows by D.N.Aidit:-

"At present, the state power in the Republic of Indonesia includes two antagonistic sides, one representing the interests of the people (in support of the people) and the other the interests of the enemy of the people (the opposition to the people). The side supporting the people is becoming stronger day by day, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has even adopted revolutionary anti-Imperialist measures". (D.N.Aidit: The Indonesian Revolution and the immediate tasks of the Indonesian Communist Party. Foreign Languages Edition Peking, 1965 pp 137/8 of the French Edition).

CLASS INTEREST

For a Marxist, every state apparatus, no matter what its antagonistic sides, always serves the fundamental interests of one class ruling over another. The state, said Engels, in the final analysis is a group of armed men. What class interests did the Indonesian state and the Indonesian army serve? The events of October 1965 do not leave the least doubt as to the answer to that question -- the interests of the so-called "national" bourgeoisie. But the real crime was that the PKI leadership accepted Stalin's "principal" according to which the Communist movement must line up completely with the diplomatic manoeuvres of the so-called socialist states. The "principal" signifies disaster for the workers' movement and is contrary to the practices of Lenin's time, but is fostered by both Moscow and Peking today (and if our critics wish to disagree with this statement then we can re-open the history of the Stalinist movement in any country and give examples). The 'theory' of the PKI leadership was little more than a theoretical fig-leaf for the foreign policy ^{needs} of the workers' states, which in turn are nothing more than a rationalisation of the bureaucracy's attachment to the present - untenable - world status quo, an attachment which finds expression in calls for peaceful co-existence from both Peking and Moscow.

Guided by the need for "peaceful co-existence" with "progressive, non-aligned" capitalist friends in a "united front against the main enemy", the PKI went along with "Bung (Brother) Karno's" cynical strategy of 'Nasakom' - a popular front of the Army, the "national capitalist" and religious groups, crowned at the apex by President Sukarno, the Bonapartist par excellence. Sukarno was doing a balancing act, resting at one moment upon the PKI and the religious groups to keep the army in line, and the next moment upon the "national" capitalists to keep the PKI in line. Externally Sukarno balanced between the workers states on one hand and Imperialism on the other. When the need arose he showed that he was capable of playing off the Soviet Union against China, and US Imperialism against first Dutch, and then British Imperialism.

BLOC OF FOUR CLASSES

When, in late 1962, the PKI became known as "anti-revisionist", their leadership stuck to the same reactionary class-collaborationist line; no change in policy was required from this Stalinist leadership - only a transference of loyalty from the Moscow to the Peking bureaucrats, which meant that from then on Mao's theory of the Bloc of Four Classes became the new guideline for the party. The shift of duty from Moscow to Peking coincided with a shift by Sukarno himself - having equipped his army and air-force with Russian aid, Bung Karno wanted to pick up what aid he could from Peking.

At the preliminary Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference and later at the full meeting, the Indonesians led a campaign against participation by the "European" USSR. Indonesia had received almost \$ two billion in military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and the East Europeans, but was defaulting on its payments: so the Soviet bureaucrats found themselves booted from the A.A. Conference in Jakarta's Sports Palace which, as a Pravda correspondent noted, had been built with Russian money and skill.

SOVIET RETALIATION

Russia retaliated by trying to manipulate the conflicts within Indonesia. The army was used to achieve Indonesian adherence to Moscow's Test Ban Treaty, in spite of PKI and Chinese opposition. In 1963 a Soviet Trade Union delegation had a heated encounter with the PKI Secretariat and subsequently issued a statement emphasising that the "Indonesian People" (read 'army') "would oppose those who minimise the Test Ban Treaty". Defence Minister General Nasution was invited to Moscow and given wholehearted backing in the Malaysian confrontation. With Moscow clearly supporting confrontation the PKI reversed its line and Aidit came out with a warning against "adventurism" because "some people" (read 'the army') planned to exploit the conflagration on the border in order to impose a state of emergency and ban the PKI.

HELP THE POLICE!!

But while the struggle for power went on behind the scenes the rank and file of the PKI were recruited and fed on a different diet altogether. The PKI publicly called for "co-operation between the people and the armed forces", and to offset unrest over the deterioration on the economic front raised as a major slogan "FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CIVIL ORDER, HELP THE POLICE!" (from Spartacist No 5). In March 1965 when petroleum workers took control of Standard Vacuum's refineries at Sungei Gerong and Pendopo the PKI allowed and helped Sukarno's government to return these plants to their Imperialist owners. Foreign Minister Subandrio, another friend of Peking, issued apologies to the firms and assured them that "there would be no further embarrassment of Americans" (New York Times, 19.3.65).

In return for this aid, Bung Karno bestowed cabinet posts and other favours upon the PKI, including the outlawing of the left wing political opposition. This reciprocal relationship was further illustrated at the celebration of the 45th Anniversary of the founding of the PKI, when party chairmen Aidit eulogised His Excellency: "Among us ... is Bung Karno. The clear sky above us is witness to it. Thousands of eyes see him. Millions of people are listening to him over the radio and watching him on their TV screens Sukarno's portrait hangs beside those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin". (Spartacist No 5 Nov/Dec '65.)

MANOEUVRES

From May to September was spent in a fight behind the stage, manoeuvres between Sukarno and the PKI against the army, aimed not against US influence in the army, but at the influence of the Soviet Union. In this struggle a strange reversal of alliances took place with the Foreign Minister Subandrio -- who had condemned the first Chinese nuclear explosion in Oct 1964 - now joining forces with the PKI. Subandrio was quoted as saying on his return from a trip to Peking that the Chinese People's Republic was a "giant" and that one had to "get along with her from the start".

In July 1965 the PKI started to apply pressure in private for the arming of the masses (read 'Party') and were supported by Subandrio and the Air Force chief of Staff Omar Dani. On Indonesian National Day in August Sukarno came down on the side of Aidit, Dani and Subandrio in agreeing in principle to

to the "arming of the masses". The army - which had the arms - showed no intention of arming anybody but instead stood poised for an immediate clash.

On September 30th, units of Sukarno's Palace Guard, led by one Untung (hitherto unknown) and aided by the PKI's Pemuda Rakjat youth from Halim Air Force base, attempted to exterminate the regular army's top leadership by killing Yani and other generals. Failing to get Nasution, they were defeated by army units under Suharto and fled via Halim base, where the bodies of the generals were dumped down a well. At the same time Sukarno himself went voluntarily to Halim accompanied by the Palace Guard Unit.

MASSACRE

The defeat of this coup led to the massacre of five ^{hundred} thousand party members; for the mass of party members and supporters did not fight back: they had never been prepared for this inevitable confrontation with the army. The PKI had failed to utilise the innumerable mass actions during the recent years to organise a systematic offensive aiming at the conquest of power by the working class and the poor peasants. So when battle was joined they found that the character of their mass support, under the national united front policy, was such that few supporters were ready or able to support an insurrection against their partners in that United Front. The few who came forward were no match for the Russian-modernised armed forces and police acting in conjunction with the "national capitalists" and landlords.

Naturally the struggle has not ended in Indonesia. A part of the cadres have been able to go underground. The discontent of the hungry masses is increasing from day to day; the empty stomachs of the workers and peasants are not filled through massacres. The revolt will widen against the corrupt regime. The people will again have their turn. But the dead cannot be resurrected. A correct policy could have averted these very heavy losses and this serious defeat.

REACTIONS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA

It is interesting to see what were the reactions of both Moscow and Peking to this, the greatest defeat for the colonial revolution since 1947. In reporting the events Moscow for long confined itself to quotations from western news agency reports. Its first major reaction, by Izvestia in mid-October, gleefully took the PKI to task for the stupidity of supporting the coup in its organ Harian Rakjat, on Oct 2nd (24 hours after the attempt had failed). Subsequently, the CPSU dutifully paid lip-service to Communist solidarity, deploring the suppression of the PKI --- but its protests carry little conviction.

The PKI was no part of the Soviet camp, but under Peking's wing. But the Chinese Communist leaders covered up all their errors, making no public criticism of them. Together with the Soviet leaders, they thus share the responsibility for what happened. Yet, in numerous articles devoted to the history of the Chinese Revolution of 1925/27, in numerous criticisms of "Krushchevist revisionism", the Chinese leaders have severely condemned the thesis according to which there could be a state that is neither bourgeois nor "socialist". They likewise condemned the idea of a bloc with the national bourgeoisie under the

latter's leadership; and the illusion that the bourgeoisie could lead a consistent struggle against Imperialism. But the PKI leaders were guilty of all these errors of such fatal consequence, and the leaders of the Chinese CP have maintained silence about this.

Lest there be any doubt concerning Peking's implication in this defeat and slaughter, no amount of zeal by the most ardent pro-Maoist can produce a single word of political analysis of this defeat from a published Peking source! For over six months - from the October butchery until its issue of April 29th 1966 - Peking Review had much space to give to such profound Indonesian matters as the theft of a plaque from the Chinese Embassy, but not a word to say on the hundreds of thousands of Communist corpses choking Indonesian rivers. As Renmin Ribao proudly claimed on March 30th in its editorial,

"Up until today, the Chinese press has not not even published a single commentary on the change in the situation in Indonesia in recent months".

This criminal suppression of the truth by Peking demonstrates that it, like Moscow, will in the last analysis betray a revolution in the interest of diplomatic manoeuvring with counter-revolution.

TRAGEDY

The result of the Indonesian tragedy has been a 180-degree turn in the tactical situation in southeast Asia in favour of US Imperialism. On April 16 '66 Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, speaking before the Senate Far East Subcommittee, explained a possible change in present Chinese policy:

"We know - the whole world knows - that the Chinese Communists have suffered setbacks during the past 14 months ... they have suffered a major setback in Indonesia - the Indonesian Communist Party has been decimated".

Since then Peking has suffered more setbacks. The New York Times reported on the 13th October that even the Cambodian Government draws back from China on the valid grounds that she has done nothing to stop the incessant bombing of North Vietnam. China's rotten manoeuvres have helped drive all the other workers' states (eg Cuba, N. Vietnam and now N. Korea) except Albania, either towards neutrality or towards siding with the USSR at China's expense. The Japanese CP has broken from China and returned to fold of 'Holy Mother Russia'. Mao's former "ally" the Indian Government is now an "Imperialist pawn" (which it always was), as China's new friend Pakistan was yesterday and will be tomorrow. When Boumediene's "palace coup" took place in Algeria China cynically supported him because of his rejection of the 'Trotskyists' who had surrounded Ben Bella, and because of his "staunch support" of Peking's forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference; they now keep quiet about his recent oil giveaway to France.

INTERNATIONALISM

In the world the pro-Chinese are reduced to small, microscopic groups, and yet some people think that they have something to offer the Irish working class. This one lesson, if no others, must be learned. In the coming Irish Revolution our policy, our programme, our strategy, our tactics, must be based on rejection of "advice" from Stalinist Moscow or Peking.

Our policy must be based on the interests, not of a foreign bureaucracy, but of the international working class. This is the only leninist way forward for a Marxist party. All other roads lead to disaster.

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discussion

MARXISM AND HISTORY

NUMBER 3.

Comrade Lever's reply to Sean Hutton's attack on Marxism leaves little to be desired, but perhaps I might be permitted a few remarks since the original essay interested me?

Hutton states that Marx and Engels saw social development in terms of constant change (It would indeed be an unusual sort of development which was unaccompanied by change, S.M.) brought about by the successive opposition and resolution of conflicting forces within society on the pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. ... "This was the pattern of the dialectic which Marx took over from Hegel with modification".

Marx's name has ever been coupled with that of Hegel by his critics in order to shorten Marx's great stature. By implying that he was a disciple of Hegel they sought to deny his originality and genius; and they hoped to discredit his materialist dialectic on the pretence that it was similar to the Hegelian Idealist dialectic; (the only similarity being verbal - Thesis, antithesis and synthesis". As a matter of interest I might remark that I have not come across these words in any of Marx's writings!! But perhaps Hutton has been more fortunate?)

But Marx himself took the opportunity of discussing his alleged 'Hegelianism', and said that though he had passed through the school of the 'great thinker',

he had nevertheless "overturned and demystified the dialectic while extracting its core". (Preface to 2nd Edition of Capital, 1873). In the same preface he says "My own dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from the Hegelian dialectical method, but is its exact opposite". Later in his essay Hutton says that Marx 'modified' Hegel! Either these assertions are worthless or Marx didn't know his own mind. In the chapter on Value Marx says that he 'Coquetted with the mode of expression of Hegel', and did indeed imitate and even parody the Hegelian style. In spite of Marx's clear and unequivocal statement, however, his "critics" for over half a century have chosen to confound his style with his method. Perhaps the reason is that "In its (the dialectic's S.M.) rational form it is a scandal and an abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary". (Preface to Capital, 1873)

I would now like to take up Hutton's statement that unless we accept as given the "end of the process" (ie the proletarian revolution) the materialist conception of history "can have no relevance for the future". I frankly admit I am not quite certain what is meant. It is like saying "unless one accepts the existence of the atmosphere as given - then any theory of man as a being with lungs is useless". Is the latter statement meaningful?

If on the other hand what was meant was that Marx believed in the inevitability of the proletarian revolution, and on the basis of this belief worked out (backwards as it were) his materialist conception of history - then this is easily refuted. Marx: "In 1842-43, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, I found myself embarrassed at first when I had to take part in discussions concerning so-called material interests. Finally the debates on free trade and protection, gave me the first impulse to take up the study of economic questions"... "I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state are rooted in the material conditions of life and that the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. The general conclusion at which I arrived may be formulated briefly as follows: In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive

forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production From forms of development of productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. The Bourgeois relations of productions are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production at the same time productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the conditions for the solution of the antagonism".

Marx states that "the debates on free trade and protection" gave him the "first impulse" to take up the study of economic questions. He was led to the conclusion that " at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces ... come in conflict with the existing relations of productions". Then begins an epoch of social revolution. In class terms: Under Capitalism the proletariat overthrows the bourgeoisie; the proletarian revolution occurs!

From the unavoidably lengthy quotation it emerges that Marx, far from accepting the victory of the Proletarian revolution as given, only arrived at the idea of the necessity of this revolution (I should, perhaps, say was driven to this conclusion) -- "the end term" after working out the other "terms". Hutton stands the thing on its head. In fact, given the first term, the end term follows of necessity.

The process, as depicted by Marx, is very simple. In order to live, men produce the means of subsistence. In producing them, they are related to one another through their production; relations of production are formed. These relations of production come into being, are built on, derive from the given form of production and as a consequence of this assist the development of production. As production develops ITS FORM CHANGES. BUT THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION REMAIN STATIC. The relations of production are no longer in harmony with the mode of production in its new form. There is friction between the two, or as Marx put it "from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters". A point is reached when . production is disrupted; when the productive forces are unable to develop further without a radical ie fundamental change in the relations of production, without these relations being revolutionised. Inevitably they are revolutionised. (Then begins an epoch of social revolution).

It is men who are related in production, and in class societies classes that are related. The relations of production are property relations, one class being the owners of property (the means of production) the other class being non owners. It is these very property relations that are fundamentally changed, revolutionised so that the property owners are expropriated. And it is again MEN, definite classes, who perform the revolutionary act.

The disintegration of Capitalist society (what remains of it) is palpable. Perhaps Sean Hutton thinks that the farmers will expropriate the capitalists, or the capitalists the workers? The end term argument might have fooled some people had it been adduced say in the 19th Century, but it is

a bit late in the day now fifty years after October 1917, the date of the first successful proletarian revolution, because on that date serious speculation as to whether or not Marx was right was halted. Who would not accept as given such an "end term" fifty years after the event, and all the more so in view of the fact that similar "end terms" have happened in 13 other countries. Scholarly quibbles and reservations are no longer tenable. Marx was proved correct by historical events. The proletarian revolution occurred as he forecast; the expropriators were expropriated.

The Albert Camus of this world remain in the shabby and discredited business of 'refuting' Marx by courtesy of the gullibility of thoughtless people like Sean Hutton who really ought to know better.

Comrade Lever made no attempt to answer Hutton's objections to Engels' "revisionism" so it is necessary to deal with this question. The core of Hutton's objection is that to say that the "Superstructure of ideas has an activity of its own, and that there is an interaction between the 'superstructure' of ideas and the material basis" implies 'a contradiction of a purely materialist and determinist position'. Three quotations from Engels are given in two of which it is explained by Engels that "the economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate (my emphasis S.M.) explanation of the whole superstructure of juridical and political institutions ... of a given historical period". In the second extract from Engels the word "ultimate" is underlined by Engels himself, who goes on to say that the economic element is not the only determining one; that the elements of the superstructure (ideas, political institutions etc) in turn determine the economic base, that there is 'interaction'.

Hutton seems to imply, or understand Engels to mean, in the first formulation, that the 'superstructure' that grows on the 'basis' exerts no influence in its turn on the 'basis', and when Engels develops this idea (for the benefit of his 'critics') Hutton has the temerity to object that 'Engels himself does not seem to have been quite satisfied with this definition', and 'The determinist position is considerably qualified'. Anyone who observes Sean Hutton's 'critical' exercises can only shrug their shoulders and marvel at the ingratitude of the man!

The use of the words "ultimate", "ultimately" by Engels was deliberate. In saying that the ideological superstructure can only be ultimately explained by reference to the economic basis it implies (presupposes) the intermediate effect of one or a number of other (superstructural) factors. In this connection I would like to draw attention to Marx's remark that the property relations existing when the productive forces reach a certain level encourage the further growth of these forces for a time, and then begin to hamper that growth. This is a reminder of the fact that though ^a given state of the productive forces is the cause of the given productive relations, and in particular of the property relations, the latter (once they have arisen as a consequence of the former) begin themselves to influence that cause. Thus there arises an interaction between the productive forces and the social economy. Since a whole superstructure of social relations, sentiments and concepts grows on the economic basis, that superstructure first fostering and then hindering the economic development, there arises between the superstructure

and the basis an interaction which provides the key to an understanding of all these phenomena which at first glance seem to contradict the fundamental thesis of historical materialism.

Marx and Engels created the 'ideology' of Marxism. They never tired of exhorting the workers to revolution, never ceased to instil in the minds of the workers the recognition of the necessity for the overthrow of Capitalism. Although the transition from Capitalism to Communism was made inevitable by the development of the productive forces they pointed out that the class struggle (an important element of the 'superstructure') was the mechanism of transition and Marxist ideas (another superstructural element) a component part of ^{the} class struggle. But it is easy to understand that one who attaches no importance to superstructural elements as factors in determining economic development has no logical ground for trying to instil any such recognition whatsoever in the minds of any social group. The recognition by Marx and Engels of the role of superstructural factors goes back to the Communist Manifesto and earlier and is no latter-day revisionism of Engels.

In conclusion I recommend for our critic's earnest consideration Engels' letter to Franz Mehring of July 1893 which reads in part: "... Hanging together with this is the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any effect upon history. The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregarding of interaction". In saying this Engels was only repeating and explaining what Marx had written as far back as 1845 in the third Thesis on Feuerbach. There Marx reproached the earlier materialists with having forgotten that "if men are products of circumstances ... it is men that change circumstances". Consequently the task of materialism in the sphere of history lay precisely in explaining in what manner circumstances can be changed by those (and by any elements of the superstructure) who are themselves created by them. This problem was solved by reference to the relations of production that develop under the influence of conditions independent of the human will. Saying that production relations have changed means saying that mutual relations have changed among people engaged in that production. A change in these relations cannot take place "automatically" i.e. independently of human activity, because they are relations established among men in the process of their activities. The mode of production is the arbiter, man is the executive. Production determines, in broad outline, the direction and character of that change.

Men make their history themselves, but because their aspirations clash, because their will is not a collective will according to a collective plan, the result arrived at is usually quite different from that intended. Hence the outcome appears to be purely accidental. Change depends not upon human will, but upon specific changes in production relations; and the more 'free' men feel their activities are (i.e. the less aware they are of the determining effect of the productive relations) the more will the development of society as a whole be governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident.

CENTRISM

BY

LEON TROTSKY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE. Except for Stalinism, the groups and parties mentioned
----- by Trotsky in these notes have disappeared from the
scene; the Second World War, which they failed so hope-
lessly to prevent, swept them aside. The labour movement in general has also
changed enormously. After the collapse in Germany in 1933, and of the "bril-
liant" Austrian Social Democracy before Dolfus' guns in Vienna a year later,
not even the reformists dared openly proclaim their positions, or openly def-
end their parliamentary cretinism: they were forced to "disavow themselves".
But today even the so-called Communist Parties have become openly legalist
and sunk to a level of puerile reformism politically far lower than the Cen-
trism Trotsky deals with here.

Why then reproduce this article? Because there ^{are} still two poles: Marxism and
reformism; and still Centrism oscillates between them. The drama is essent-
ially the same even if the roles are filled by different people. For this
reason Trotsky's analysis of the varieties of Centrism and its nature is as
relevant today as thirty years ago, and unless we learn to recognise and
understand the shadings we will pay for it dearly in the struggles to come.
This is particularly true because today there is a large number of small
Centrist Groups, some of which even adapt phrases and dehydrated ideas from
Trotsky himself to help cover their accommodation to the Labour bureaucracy.
These are unimportant but symptomatic; and should serve to teach us the need
for ~~that~~ clarity and ideological sharpness for which Trotsky strives here.

The article's optimism for the immediate future of the revolutionary movement
was premature. It has not been borne out - not yet. Stalinism was too
strong in the thirties: because it appeared to stand under the banner of the
October Revolution, it was able to attract and lead to defeat generations of
would-be revolutionaries. These defeats depressed the movement even further
and those who stood with Trotsky for the genuine Bolshevism were isolated.
Yet the Bolshevik Leninists as a body have not disappeared as have the old
Centrists groupings; they did not degenerate (despite individual lapses) --
the banner preserved from the Stalinist mud by Trotsky is still a spotless
banner; the Programme defended by the heroic rearguard of Bolshevism is
still the axis of the proletarian revolution. We republish Trotsky's ana-
lysis as part of the armament of the new revolutionary generation who will
carry Trotsky's fight to its conclusion: workers power.

(First published in New York MILITANT, March 1934, under the title - "Centrism and the Fourth International".)

The events in Austria, coming after the events in Germany, placed a final cross over "classic" reformism. Henceforth only the dullest leaders of British and American trade-unionism, and their French follower, Jouhaux, the president of the Second International Vandervelde, and similar political ichthyosauri will dare to speak openly of the perspectives of peaceful development, democratic reforms, etc. The overwhelming majority of the reformists consciously take on new colours now. Reformism yields to the innumerable shadings of centrism which now dominate the field of the workers' movement in the majority of countries. This creates an entirely new and, in a sense, unprecedented situation for work in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism (Bolshevism). The New International can develop principally at the expense of the now-prevailing tendencies and organisations. At the same time the revolutionary International cannot form itself otherwise than in a constant struggle against centrism. Under these conditions ideological irreconcilability and the flexible policy of the united front serve as weapons for the attainment of one and the same end.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRISM

One must first of all understand the most characteristic traits of modern Centrism. That is not easy: first, because Centrism, due to its organic amorphousness, yields with difficulty to a positive definition: it is characterised to a much greater extent by what it lacks than by what it embraces: secondly, never has Centrism yet played to such an extent as now with all the colours of the rainbow, because never yet have the ranks of the working class been in such FERMENT as at the present time. Political ferment, by the very essence of the term, means a re-alignment, a shift between two poles, Marxism and reformism: that is to say, the passing through the various stages of Centrism.

No matter how difficult a general definition of Centrism, which of necessity always has a "conjunctural" character, nevertheless, we can and must bring out the outstanding characteristics and peculiarities of the Centrist groupings originating from the breakdown of the Second and Third Internationals.

(a) Theoretically, Centrism is amorphous and eclectic; so far as is possible, it evades theoretical obligations and inclines (in words) to give preference to "revolutionary practice" over theory, without understanding that only Marxist theory can impart revolutionary direction to practice.

Centrist Ideology

(b) In the sphere of Ideology, Centrism leads a parasitic existence: it repeats against the revolutionary Marxists the old Menshevik arguments (Martov, Axelrod, Plekhanov) usually without suspecting this: on the other hand, its main arguments against the Right it borrows from the Marxists, that is first of all from the Bolshevik-Leninists, dulling, however, the sharp edge of criticism, avoiding practical conclusions, thereby rendering their criticism meaningless.

(c) A Centrist readily proclaims his hostility to reformism; but he does not mention Centrism; moreover, he considers the very definition of Centrism

as "unclear", "arbitrary", etc; in other words, Centrism does not like to be called by its own name.

(d) A Centrist, always uncertain of his position, and of his methods, views with hatred the revolutionary principle: to state what is; he is inclined to substitute for a principled policy ^{personal} manoeuvring and petty organisational diplomacy.

(e) A Centrist always remains in spiritual dependence on Rightist groupings, is inclined to cringe before those who are more moderate, to remain silent on their opportunist sins and to colour their actions before the workers.

(f) His shilly-shallying the Centrist frequently covers up by reference to the danger of "sectarianism", by which he understands not abstract propagandist passivity (of the Bordigist type) but an active concern for purity of principles, clarity of position, political consistency, organisational completeness.

(g) A Centrist occupies a position between an opportunist and a Marxist, somewhat analagous to that which a petit bourgeois occupies between a capitalist and a proletarian: he kow-tows before the first and has contempt for the second.

On the International Arena

(h) On the international arena the Centrist distinguishes himself, if not by blindness, then by short-sightedness; he does not understand that in the present epoch a national revolutionary party can be built only as part of an international party; in the choice of his international allies the Centrist is even less discriminating than in his own country.

(i) A Centrist sees in the policy of the Comintern only "Ultra-left" deviations, adventurism, putschism, ignoring completely the Right-opportunist zig-zags (Kuo Min Tang, Anglo-Russian Committee, pacifist foreign policy, anti-fascist bloc, etc.)

(j) A Centrist always swears readily by the policy of the United Front, emptying it of its revolutionary content and transforming it from a tactical method into a supreme principle.

(k) A Centrist readily resorts to pathetic moralising to cover up his ideological emptiness; he does not understand that revolutionary morality can be formed only on the basis of revolutionary doctrine and revolutionary policy.

WORDS AND DEEDS

Under the pressure of circumstances the eclectic Centrist may accept even the extreme conclusions only to retreat from them afterwards in practice. Having accepted the dictatorship of the proletariat he will leave a wide margin for opportunist interpretations; having proclaimed the necessity of the Fourth International, he will work for the building of a Two-and-a-half International, etc....

The most malignant example of Centrism is, if you wish, the German group "Begin Anew" (Neu Beginnen). Superficially repeating the Marxist criticism of Reformism, it comes to the conclusion that all the misfortunes of the proletariat follow from splits and that salvation lies in the safeguarding of the unity of the Social-Democratic Parties. These Gentlemen place the organisational discipline

of Wels ^{1.} and Co. higher than the historic interests of the proletariat. And since Wels and Co. subordinate the party to the discipline of the bourgeoisie, the group "Begin Anew", cloaked by left criticism stolen from the Marxists, represents in reality a harmful agency of the bourgeois order, even though an agency of the second degree.

The so-called London (now Amsterdam ^{2.}) Bureau represents an attempt at creating an international focal point for centrist eclecticism, under the banner of which the Right and Left opportunist groupings, which do not dare to choose finally a direction and a banner, try to unite. In this, as in other cases, the Centrists try to direct the movement obliquely along a diagonal course. The elements composing the bloc pull in opposite directions, the N.A.P. (Norwegian Labour Party) cautiously moves towards the Second International; the I.L.P. (of Britain) partly towards the Third, partly towards the Fourth; the S.A.P. (Socialist Workers' Party of Germany) and the O.S.P. (Independent Socialist Party of Holland) veering and vacillating towards the Fourth. Exploiting and preserving the ideological amorohousness of all its participants and trying to compete in the work for the creation of a new International, the bloc of the "London Bureau" plays a reactionary role. The failure of this grouping is absolutely inevitable.

BUREAUCRATIC CENTRISM

The definition of the policy of the Comintern as that of BUREAUCRATIC Centrism retains its full force now too. As a matter of fact, only CENTRISM is capable of constant leaps from opportunistic betrayals to ultra-Left adventurism; only the powerful SOVIET BUREAUCRACY could for ten years assure a stable base for the ruinous policy of zigzags.

Bureaucratic Centrism, in distinction from Centrist groupings which crystallised out of the social democracy, is the product of the degeneration of Bolshevism; it retains - in caricature form - some of its traits, still leads a considerable number of revolutionary workers, disposes of extraordinary material and technical means, but by its political influence is now the crassest, most disorganising and harmful variety of Centrism. The political break-down of the Comintern, clear to the whole world, signifies of necessity the further decomposition of bureaucratic centrism. In this sphere our task is to save the best elements for the cause of the proletarian revolution. Side by side with tireless principled criticism, our main weapon for influencing the workers still remaining under the banner of the Comintern is the further penetration of our ideas and methods into those wide masses, who stand now in overwhelming majority outside the influence of the Comintern.

1. Wels: German Labour leader; made a speech in the Reichstag after Hitler came to power, pledging 'loyalty'. But the bourgeoisie no longer needed his loyalty... (Ed.)

2. The London-Amsterdam Bureau was formed in 1932.
(Ed.)

ADAPTION TO REFORMIST MANOEUVRES

Precisely now, when reformism is forced to renounce itself, transforming itself into Centrism, some groupings of LEFT Centrism, on the contrary, stop short in their development and even move backwards. It seems to them that the reformists have already grasped almost everything, that it is necessary only not to play with exorbitant demands, criticism, extreme phraseology, and that then with one blow one can create a mass "revolutionary" party.

In reality, reformism, forced by events to disavow itself, having no clear programme, no revolutionary tactics, is capable only of lulling the advanced workers to sleep by inculcating in them the idea that the revolutionary regeneration of their party is already achieved.

For a revolutionary Marxist the struggle against reformism is now almost fully replaced by the struggle against Centrism. The mere bare counter-posing of legal struggle to illegal, of peaceful means to violence, of democracy to dictatorship, now goes beside the mark in the majority of cases, because the frightened reformist, disavowing himself, is ready to accept the most "revolutionary" formulas, if only they do not obligate ^{him} today to a decisive break with his own irresolution, indecision and expectant waiting. The struggle with hidden or masked opportunists must therefore be transferred chiefly to the sphere of PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM REVOLUTIONARY REQUISITES.

Before seriously accepting Centrist talk of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" we must demand a serious defence against Fascism, a complete break with the bourgeoisie, a systematic building of a workers' militia, its training in militant spirit, the creation of inter-party defence centres, anti-Fascist staffs, the banishment from their ranks of parliamentary, trade union and other traitors, bourgeois lackeys and careerists also. Precisely on this plane the main fights against Centrism must now be fought. To carry on the struggle with success it is necessary to have free hands, that is, not only to retain full organisational independence but also critical intransigence with regard to the most "left" offshoots of Centrism.

EVENTS FORCE REALIGNMENTS

Bolshevik-Leninists in all countries must realise clearly the peculiarities of the new stage in the struggle for the Fourth International. The events in Austria and France gave a powerful impetus to the realignment of the forces of the proletariat in a revolutionary direction. But precisely this universal supplanting of open reformism by Centrism develops a powerful attractive force with regard to Left-Centrist groupings (SAP, CSP) which only yesterday were about to unite with the Bolshevik-Leninists. This dialectic process may produce the impression on the surface that the Marxian wing is again "isolated" from the masses. A flagrant delusion! The veerings of Centrism to the Right and to the Left follow from its very nature. There will be yet tens and hundreds of such episodes on our road. It would be the most wretched faint-heart-

3. Feb. 1934; the Stavitsky scandal caused 200,000 Rightists to demonstrate on the Place de la Concorde and, armed with razors and revolvers, to attempt to enter the Parliament. Police fired killing 20. The outcry from the Right, joined by the ultra-left CP, led the 'radical' Premier to resign. On Feb 12th on the call of the SP, 4m. workers struck.

edness to fear to go forward just because the road is strewn with obstacles or because not all the fellow-travellers will arrive at the very end.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Whether the new opportunist vacillations of our Centrist allies will prove conjunctural or final (in reality they will be of both kinds), the general conditions for the formation of the Fourth International on the basis of genuine Bolshevism become more and more favourable. The chase of the "extreme left" Centrists after the simply "lefts", of the lefts after moderates, of the moderates after the Rights, like the chase of a man after his own shadow, cannot create any stable mass organisation; The miserable experience of the German Independent Party (USP) retains now also its full force. Under the pressure of events, with the aid of our criticisms and slogans, the advanced workers will step over the vacillations of the most left Centrist leaders, and, if it should become necessary, also over these leaders themselves. On the road to a new International, the proletarian vanguard will find no other answers than those which have been elaborated and are being elaborated by the Bolshevik-Leninists on the basis of international experience during ten years of uninterrupted theoretical and practical struggle.

During the past year our political influence has grown greatly in a number of countries. We shall be able to develop and broaden these successes in a comparatively short time under the following conditions:

- (a) Not to outsmart the historical process, not to play hide-and-seek, but to state what is;
- (b) to give ourselves a theoretical accounting of the changes in the general situation which in the present epoch frequently takes on the nature of sharp turns;
- (c) to heed carefully the mood of the masses, without prejudices, without illusions, without self-deception, in order on the basis of a correct estimate of the relationship of forces within the proletariat to avoid opportunism as well as adventurism, and to lead the masses forward, not throw them back;
- (d) every day, every hour, to answer clearly to ourselves what OUR NEXT PRACTICAL STEP must be, tirelessly to prepare this step, and on the basis of living experience explain to the workers the principled differences of Bolshevism from all other parties and currents.
- (e) not to confuse tactical tasks of a united front with the basic historic task, the creation of new parties and a new International.
- (f) not to neglect the weakest ally for the sake of PRACTICAL action;
- (g) to watch critically the most "left" ally as a possible adversary;
- (h) to treat with the greatest attention those groupings which actually gravitate to us; patiently and carefully to listen to their criticisms, doubts and vacillations; to help them develop towards Marxism; not to be frightened by their caprices, threats, ultimatums (Centrists are always capricious and touchy); not to make any concessions to them in principle;
- (i) AND ONCE AGAIN, NOT TO FEAR TO STATE WHAT IS.

BLOOD SACRIFICE ? GREAVES ON 1916.

by JACKIE CLEARY

"How were the men who died for a Republic in 1916 to be harnessed to the task of re-establishing the Union? Clearly the Irish bourgeoisie must have a story. The story is roughly that into the evolving affairs of a contented or indifferent people leapt a suicidal band of revolutionary idealists determined to save the soul of the Nation through a blood sacrifice. They aroused not enthusiasm but hostility and forfeited their lives. But then " a terrible beauty was born", all that was unchanged by the rising was "changed utterly" by the executions. Inspired by the sacrifice the Irish people accomplished feats which otherwise would have been impossible, and thus finally was established the Ireland of today in which the National aspiration had been achieved and too enthusiastic Republicans can be put in jail."

To refute this crowd's and heroes version of modern Irish history, and place 1916 in the perspective of the struggles of the years 1913 to '23, Desmond Greaves discusses two articles by the Assistant Editor of the London Times, A.P. Ryan (1). The ever more open agreement of the ruling class in the British policy of full re-integration must naturally involve amending the accepted view of the War of Independence, and of the horrors associated with British rule. Coogan in his recent book (2) quotes Minister of Education O'Maille as utterly dissatisfied with the way history is taught in Irish schools -- dwelling on the details of hundreds of years of struggle generates Republicanism, you see. The way history is taught is idealist to say the least; but in the new version which is slowly emerging, idealised class and national struggles give place to the myth of the Rising as the blood sacrifice that changed the course of Irish history and of itself generated the War of Independence. The struggles before and after are faded out and 1916 becomes even more legendary than the need to suppress the real ideas of Connolly has made it up to now.

FROM THE UNION TO THE RISING

Greaves retraces the events in outline. The Union had meant the death of Irish industry and after the repeal of the Corn Laws there had been a continual agrarian crisis resulting from virgin land wheat. Home Rule was the bourgeois demand by the last quarter of the 19th century; the essential demand was Fiscal Autonomy. The Land Purchases (an ideal bourgeois revolution if ever there was one, with the peasants as state mortgagees buying out their age-old oppressors) made the idea of Home Rule acceptable to the Liberals who were eager to transfer the costs of the land purchase to an Irish Exchequer. Fine for the Liberals, but for the industrialists of Ulster with the largest taxable capacity it was a different matter. They had joined the southern merchants and manufacturers in 1896 to oppose overtaxation of Ireland; now the same question split the Irish bourgeoisie in two. With tariff

(1.) In a paper published by the Historians Group of the C.P. 1916 AS HISTORY.

(2) IRELAND SINCE THE RISING.

control withheld Home Rule was less than attractive to the Northern Bourgeoisie and each installment of Land Purchase made it more repellent than ever; their rabid Unionism was thus fear of being thrown to the wolves.

The split in the bourgeoisie was extended to the working class. In the towns the farmers were blamed for high food prices, and for the Northern protestant workers a papist was typically a southern farmer: - Home Rule to subsidise the farmer?!! The division between town and country emerged as a regional division, ^{and} under the manipulations of the Unionists, a religious one. Playing the Orange card the landlords and Tories split off a section of the proletariat, controlled the protestant workers of the industrially most advanced area, and hamstrung the movement towards National Autonomy. This was of course part of the Imperialist corruption which in Britain also distorted working class developments - only in the North East it found the divisions and privileges resulting from the Williamite subjugation ready made and fused with them.

The proletariat was objectively the only class capable of rallying the rural petit bourgeoisie behind it and leading the struggle against Imperialism to a conclusion. We must answer the question which Greaves doesn't even ask: was this split inevitable? No. In 1907 Jim Larkin successfully united the Belfast workers, for a time overcoming the antagonisms and divisions by showing them their real enemies. The 'infection' spread even to the Belfast Police and troops were brought in and set upon the Catholic areas of the city in order to break the unity of the workers and divide them once more against themselves. But without success. What did finally break the unity in Belfast was the action of the bureaucrats of Larkin's union - the Liverpool-based National Union of Dock Labourers, led by the future Sir James Sexton - who got together with the bosses, repudiated Larkin, stopped strike pay, and treacherously accepted a settlement which made a mockery of the great fight of the Belfast workers. Thus betrayed, with their class organisation smashed, they were again prey to the splitting tactics of the bosses, and ripe for the coming of Carson.

By the 1914 period agrarian reform, beginning with the most prosperous tenants, was half finished leaving acute divisions in the countryside. The back of the landlords was not, of course, broken until the Free State Act of 1924. Dissatisfaction expressed itself in the moonlighting societies and the physical force movement - the IRB - which was permitted, on Sean Mac Diarmada's recommendation, to hold membership in the secret societies of the west. As Home Rule approached the IRB prepared to play the role of a loyal opposition within the native parliament, striving to extend its rights; and the Home Rule bourgeoisie prepared for it by trying to smash Dublin trade unionism. Only when Redmond accepted that the split in the bourgeoisie should receive statutory recognition in partition was the idea of a revolutionary fight first, to avoid partition, discussed. After Redmond took over the Volunteers were controlled by the merchants and big farmers, who dominated the largely petit-bourgeois and proletarian ranks --- and there was great bitterness between the Volunteers and the Citizen Army.

The war cut across developments in Ireland, as it cut across the proletarian upsurge in Britain, Europe and Russia. The relative quietness of the early war period and the apparent isolation of the fighters in the Rising did not however mean that the conflicts had disappeared; it merely signified their temporary suspension by the exceptional conditions at the beginning of the war.

Later, as the war progressed, the contradictions that had seemed submerged and half forgotten re-emerged more sharply than ever. As Trotsky described the process in Russia, history again picked up the threads where they had been broken off by the war and tied them in a knot.

But at first the War meant that the farmer could sell what he produced, there was increased employment, families with men in the army became suddenly affluent with separation allowances; but even then the struggle was not completely broken off. Organised Labour and Pearse's Volunteers experienced 500 prosecutions between the outbreak of War and the Rising. For those who were determined to strike a blow at the Empire while they could still take advantage of England's difficulties there was the added problem of the 'right wing' of the National movement. Griffith, Hobson etc. declared that they would fight a guerilla war against conscription -- but they would not join an insurrection. And they had a powerful ally in Eoin MacNeill, the head of the Volunteers.

With hindsight it is clear that the prospects of immediate military success would have been far better later on, when rising prices, imminent conscription and general war weariness had matured the seeds that were only in the incubation stage during the Easter Rising. Why then did they insist on rising when they did? Greaves says: fear that Dublin Castle would strike first, and fear of peace. There seemed a real possibility of a negotiated end to the European war; Connolly above all was determined not to let the chance pass, as he had seen other opportunities pass. The failure of the arms landing and MacNeill's last minute treachery forced the abandonment of the plan for a nationwide rising, and in Dublin only the IRB and the Citizen Army turned out. Even so, in the West 1000 square miles were held by Mellows for a few days, with the support of the local people; and in Wexford they surrendered only after Dublin had fallen.

When marching out on Easter Monday they certainly had few illusions as to what they faced - but the choice by then was either to fight a forlorn battle that would prevent another of the demoralising fiascos that Connolly had chronicled so bitterly in "Labour in Irish History"; or wait like sheep to be rounded up by Dublin Castle. The die was cast and they behaved like revolutionaries.

In short there was no "Blood Sacrifice". Pearse's earlier writings on such subjects tell us nothing about the complex and diverse group of people which turned out on Easter Monday. Were the 200 Dublin trade unionists suicidal? Or Connolly? Greaves quotes a moving last message from Ceannnt which vigorously advises all future revolutionaries never to treat with the enemy but to fight on to a finish! Suicidal? Greaves: "One may as well call an unsuccessful strike a work sacrifice".

AFTER THE RISING

The theory that the post '16 upsurge was a direct result of the executions as such begs questions about earlier rebellions. 1798? 1803? 1867? No upsurge followed the executions then. What distinguished 1916 from all these? "It was the first breach in the world Imperialist war front". The crisis was real and merely hastened the reassertion by history of the actual relations of Irish life, partially obscured at the beginning of the war. The executions only

entered this process as one of its elements.

As the war progressed the hypocritical facade of Britain's declared aim of attaining the freedom of small nations wore very thin; 1916 left Ireland in no doubt at all. The Redmondites were seen as dupes whose policy was unlikely to secure even Home Rule. Prices rose, land agitation developed sharply -- and conscription loomed. Clearly an ever greater ferment. Sinn Fein emerged as the U.I.L. declined in influence. The most intense phase came not after the executions as the Blood Sacrifice theory would seem to demand but after the 1918 election and the Government's refusal to abide by the will of the people. Thereafter the struggle was against the active terrorism of Imperialism. The fighters were certainly inspired by the example of the men of 1916 -- but the motive force of their own struggle was more immediate and concrete.

Greaves sums up the 1913-23 period in all its contradictory phases as part of the first stage of the general crisis of Capitalism. In the end the bourgeoisie regained the initiative and appropriated "most but not all" of the gains of the struggle.

DESMOND GREAVES' MYTH

Greaves partly demolishes the myth of the all-transforming sacrifice, the "terrible beauty," and attempts to refurbish the broader picture of the movements that were reaching fruition in Home Rule pre W.W.I, and also in the bloody struggle against Imperialist repression that preceded the Treaty. However, in his opportunist way of doing this he tends to create his own myths. He blurs the fact that 1916 and the conflict afterwards did represent a break -- with the traditions of the Irish bourgeoisie. To read Greaves one would get little indication that in the period being discussed the Bourgeoisie were borne helplessly aloft in a national upsurge ^{against} Imperialism, an active struggle which they did not initiate and were at first unable to control. They were only able to dominate it finally when, deprived of the clarification and aid which the success of the European revolution of the same period would have given it, it had proceeded deeply into the blind alley of its own bourgeois world outlook, and when its most advanced guard was snuffed out in the very act of reorientation. Of course there are unavoidable hints at this in the pamphlet, but nowhere does Greaves develop any such picture clearly; much, in fact, denies it, particularly when Mister Greaves' own politics intrude.

THE REPUBLICANISM OF 1916

The 'new' demand in 1916 was the demand for full Independence and sovereignty -- expressed in the word REPUBLIC. In relation to Tone, Mitchell and the Fenians this was not new, but it was a radical departure from the bourgeois tradition of O'Connellism, Buttism and Redmondism. Their aspiration had been (at its most daring) regional autonomy, Ireland a self-governing province. through their social influence, not least through the priests, they held the mass of the farmers and even some of the southern town workers under their leadership. This was the tendency up to the war, which they supported, leading thousands to the slaughter. But the war created changed conditions and heightened tensions, mostly after 1916, leading to a mass explosion. The

bourgeoisie were dragged along helplessly behind, retaining control by default because of the immaturity of the masses.

The leaders in 1916 staked out a claim to the leadership of the masses and the manner of their making that claim showed clearly where they wanted to lead. By raising the Republican standard of uncompromising separatism Connolly and Pearse elbowed aside the old dominant interest in Irish politics, and they made the break explicit, or tried to within their means, by their assertion in the Proclamation that the ownership of Ireland was vested in the People of Ireland. This was necessarily vague, and when in 1919 the Labour leaders tried to write it more explicitly into the Democratic Programme of Dail Eireann they were rebuffed. But Connolly clearly recognised that the interpretation of this sort of abstraction would depend on the course of the inevitable struggle within the Nationalist revolutionary movement. The ability of the IRB to ignore the Johnsons and O'Briens in 1919 depended on those gentlemen's gutless acquiescence; under their leadership labour participated in the struggle with the General Strike, and as individual combatants -- but not with its own programme, strategy and tactics.

NON-REPUBLICAN LEADERS IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The bourgeoisie rode the waves. And even during the height of the Tan War there were people who led without fire for the fight or belief in the republican goal. Griffith for example. Indeed the beginning of military action against Imperialism was spontaneous and was only authorised by the Dail months later. De Valera also worked deliberately to keep the movement under bourgeois control - while explicitly declaring his reservations about the Republic of Connolly and Pearse. Right from the start he was the protector of the vacillaters, using his mantle of the heroic survivor of the Rebellion. Notoriously he protected MacNeill, who was more than any other responsible for the "sacrificial" side of 1916. And this was symbolic of his role. He papered over divisions verbally, veiling his own and others' lack of interest in the Republic as defined in the Declaration of Easter Monday. But on occasion he betrayed his own position:

"Win under the Republican banner, we agree on that; as to the future we can afford to differ then. Some may not, after all, favour a Republic".

As early as 1919 De Valera had talked of a British Monroe Doctrine for Ireland, a relationship between Ireland and England such as then existed between the USA and Cuba! Even after the split he stood neither for the Republic nor real sovereignty.

THE TREATY -- BOURGEOIS COMPROMISE v. WORKERS REPUBLIC

The main prize the bourgeoisie had hoped for from the War of Independence, which it would have gladly called off sooner, was to avoid the separation of the N.E. Counties. But finally, as the struggle began to deepen, and the social element became uncontrollable with a growing ferment on the land, the seizure of enterprises by workers in the West ^{and south} who even set up soviet in Limerick in May 1921 (note the date!), it became vital for their own survival to throw their full weight into stopping the war. The IRB shed its separatism when its basic bourgeois ideology came into irreconcilable conflict with, and overthrew, its republicanism; because the Republican form could not contain its real class content any more. In the sharpening struggles of 1921, when the hitherto abstract Republic showed ^a clear inclination to crystallise out as a Workers Republic, their bourgeois nationalist perspective turned the IRB inside out.

But what was the alternative to the Treaty? De Valera's policy of "external association" with the British Empire was at best an amendment to the Treaty, constituting nothing essentially different. Because a really free and really independent Ireland was and is impossible within the bounds of bourgeois relations: the demand for the Republic was mocked by Griffith in the Treaty debates as a chimera. The only possible relation of a bourgeois Ireland, divided or otherwise, to the British giant next door is subservience. Pre 1914 this was recognised in the loyal demand for Home Rule. Since 1922, despite the interlude of the Economic War, this pattern has reasserted itself.

From the point of view of Marxists it was inevitable that the bourgeoisie would betray the separatist demands -- what was not inevitable was their victory in the fight for leadership of the petit-bourgeois masses. If the proletariat had been ready, ideologically clear and organised to achieve its goals, then the bourgeoisie of all factions, De Valera and Griffith, could have been isolated in the War in Independence period as the bourgeoisie had been shouldered aside in 1916. Had the struggle been deepened into a social revolution all over Ireland, into that movement whose beginning in the West and South stampeded the bourgeoisie, this would have transformed the situation. Not only in Ireland but in Britain itself, which was as near to a proletarian revolution in that period as it has ever been (the need to keep large numbers of troops at home hindered the British prosecution of the war in Ireland). That was the only alternative to the Treaty.

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DID CONNOLLY DESERT SOCIALISM IN 1916?

The Blood Sacrifice theory seems not unreasonable to many who look at the present relations of Ireland and G.B. Clearly neo-colonialism would still prevail with a united Ireland. In view of this what but suicidal dreams could have possessed Pearse and Connolly in 1916? Their Republic was a utopia. By confining himself to the immediate concrete possibilities, Greaves evades this sort of argument. In fact, he adds to it unwittingly by ignoring Connolly's real perspectives; but like the bourgeoisie he has no option but to ignore them because they clash with his own politics.

At the beginning of the War Connolly had written: "Starting thus Ireland may light a fire which will not burn out till the last capitalist bond and debenture will burn to ashes on the grave of the last war lord".

That was Connolly's perspective: revolutionary determination to strike a blow and maybe start the fire. Greaves quotes this to show that there was no death wish on Connolly's part, but not to develop a picture of the international significance of 1916 in the eyes of its most advanced leader.

In 1916 the pacifist-socialists and vulgar evolutionists, typified by the ILP and their Dublin hangers on, regarded Connolly as a deserter from socialism to nationalism; between the two there seemed an irreconcilable contradiction. And there was; but the contradiction was between the revolutionary socialism of Connolly, and their 'socialism' of sweetness and light and human brotherhood between exploiters and exploited, and above all cringing feebleness before their enemies. But there was no contradiction between Connolly's socialism and his action in 1916, because he saw the national struggle as an element

of the world struggle against capitalism, leading up to and fusing with the proletarian revolution.

The gradualist socialists saw 1916 as not only irrelevant, but harmful, and the ILP with grand and slavish 'impartiality' condemned the 'militarism' of both the insurgents and the Imperialists. But Lenin the revolutionary socialist saw the organic connection; and only when one sees the two struggles flowing into each other does the alleged contradiction between Connolly's socialism and his leadership of the Easter Rising disappear. Thus the statement above and the advice to the Citizen Army to hold onto their guns in the event of victory emerge as the real keynotes. Looking back 'objectively' Greaves says that 1916 was the first breach in the world imperialist war front: but he carefully avoids the implications of the fact that it was the intention of the Citizen Army that it should be exactly that.

In his manner of 'defending' Connolly from the charge of suicide Greaves, failing to establish the revolutionary socialist conception of Easter 1916, winds up convicting him as a deserter from Socialism! It is certain that nowhere in Greaves' paper is the connection established that squares Easter with revolutionary socialism. But the only alternative for Greaves the leader of the Connolly Association would be to convict himself as a deserter from Connolly's ideas.... It is not possible to understand the logic of Connolly's promotion of the Rising if we confine ourselves to Ireland alone; his was not the utopia of an independent Ireland under Britain's wing. He expected a European upsurge against the War as surely as Lenin did. He had no illusions in even the extreme "left" nationalist revolutionaries with whom he marched out in 1916 - merely a policy of alliance for a limited struggle. His mistake was in entering this alliance without a properly steeled weapon, or with an imperfect one, which is what the Citizen Army was; for despite its great merits it was no substitute for a Lenin-type Party. But that is a big subject on its own....

The internationalist perspective separates the serious revolutionary Republicans of the 1916-22 period from the vacillators and deserters. The paralysis of will and political direction from which De Valera and the group around him suffered before and during the Civil War was not merely personal but the result of the untenable position their class was in, and his outlook essentially similar to Griffith. He recognised the incompatibility of the bourgeois order to which he was committed with the Republic which he had sworn to maintain. Not so Liam Mellows, the consistent republican and internationalist. in his speech in the Treaty debates he by implication criticised both Griffith and De Valera, and talked about the "crucifixion of India and the degradation of Egypt", and the unfolding world struggle. He affirmed that the Irish struggle had been for "something more than the fleshpots of Empire". In the period when the bourgeois ex-republicans were scuttling the Republic of 1916 he reached conclusions about the necessary class nature of republicanism in Ireland. And of course he declared for the Workers Republic, paying for it with his life.

Recognition of the necessary connection of the Irish struggle with the world revolution in the past and the future, and in the final analysis its dependence on it, does not of course lead us to passive waiting on others to begin and win our fight for us. On the contrary - it was the men with the internationalist perspective who began the struggle in 1916, and who needed the bullets of the

Free State renegades to quell their determination to continue the fight at all costs after 1922.

- To sum up:
- (a) In his method of refuting the suicide theory by sticking to the concrete case and possibilities, Greaves ignores the Internationalist/revolutionary socialist perspective of Connolly with all its importance for estimating the role of the bourgeoisie in the last half century.
 - (b) By failing to emphasise or develop the fact of the 1916-21 upsurge that ran away with the bourgeoisie, he himself helps cover over the gap between the 1st. Republic and the present "Republic".
 - (c) Taking both of these together we get a careful avoidance of a serious examination of the role of the bourgeoisie - and more to the point, we avoid the tricky question of Greaves' support of them in the past and even now, as 'progressive' etc; ignoring their bankruptcy, and defending them against all attack from the proletarian left.

Mister Greaves' own opportunist politics, the eulogisation of Fianna Fail, the nonsensical talk about the most progressive foreign policy of the 1950s, (the passing of which he laments in the first page of this pamphlet,) render him ^{as} incapable of exploring the real significance of 1916 as the bourgeoisie for whom he has been an apologist for so long.

Both the Irish ruling class and the opportunists such as Greaves have nothing in common with the logic of the Rising of fifty years ago - that logic was of a struggle to a finish against Imperialism, necessarily linking up with the struggles outside Ireland. That the bourgeoisie should transform 1916 into a myth follows necessarily from their hostility to its ideals; and that the Stalinists, even when exposing the bourgeois myths, should create myths of their own also follows logically from the nature of the politics of Stalinism.

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I.U.S.Y. CONGRESS RESOLUTION ON IRELAND.

The 8th Conference of the International Union of Socialist Youth was held in Vienna early this Summer. Ireland was represented for the first time by the All-Ireland Irish Association of Labour Student Organisations. Most of the Conference was lost in a bureaucratic tangle, but the following two resolutions were passed. (For a report of the Conference see IRISH MILITANT, No 5, August 1966, available, price 6d from the publisher of this magazine.)

This I.U.S.Y. Congress welcomes the 50th anniversary of the Irish Rebellion at Easter 1916. I.U.S.Y. recalls that the 1916 Rising struck a fatal blow at the structure of the British Empire and at the whole concept of the gradual progress of colonial territories under a carefully selected and trained local bourgeois elite. This process which ensures continued political control by the Imperialist power and the entrenchment of the capitalist system in the colonial territory was typified by the Parliamentary Home Rule Movement in Ireland before 1916 and was totally rejected by the leaders of the 1916 Rising, especially the great Irish Socialist leader, James Connolly.

I.U.S.Y. recognises however that just as the 1916 Rising was the first outright rejection of limited self government by a colonial territory, so in Ireland also the colonialists used for the first time many of the tactics which they have since used in other former colonies. Thus in Ireland the now familiar device of partition was used to secure for the former colonial settlers the control of the wealthiest part of the country regardless of the wishes of the Irish people as a whole, or of the native minority in the partitioned area. Within Northern Ireland the settler regime has used the device of a restricted franchise, a partisan special police force, and continuous emergency powers (all now in force by Smith's Rhodesia regime) to ensure its continued domination. It has also countenanced discrimination against the minority in N. Ireland and deliberately fomented religious strife in order to divide and weaken the working class.

In the rest of the country, after a bitter guerilla war the British made peace with the bourgeois element and encouraged and assisted them to suppress the radical nationalist and socialist elements who wanted complete independence. With their cooperation British economic penetration and domination has turned the Irish Republic into a neo-colonialist state. In the process the Irish working class has been divided and fragmented with the result that they have not won even those concessions to social justice which capitalism has had to concede in more advanced countries. Both parts of Ireland suffer from chronically high unemployment and a low standard of living which make them rank as underdeveloped territories. Thus, fifty years after Connolly's death, few of his ideals have been achieved and the Irish People have come to realise the relative worthlessness of mere political independence. I.U.S.Y. greets the Irish People in this commemorative year and recognises the need for establishing a true Workers Republic, and that only the united action of the Irish working class, North and South, Catholic and Protestant can achieve this aim.



REVIEWS

BOOKS • • • FILMS

1. 1905

2. 1911/12

3. 1923



VERTICAL INVADER

4. 1929

5. 1932

6. 1957

Success and Failure of PICASSO
 John Berger. Penguin. 12/6

This is an attempt, on the whole highly successful, at a materialist assessment of the greatest artistic legend of our time. Berger considers the effects of the man on his painting and the effects of the 20th century on the man. In thus explaining what other critics have only as yet remarked on, he has come under considerable fire from those critics - who are nevertheless forced to concede that the book is 'clever... stimulating... brilliant... fascinating...' etc.

We now find the critics, faced with the 800 & odd works by Picasso currently on show in Paris, remarking once more in bewilderment on some of the characteristics which Berger examines intimately. They point out the most obvious contradictions in Picasso's work. "What makes Picasso run?" asks Mullins of the Telegraph; "to rely upon inspiration argues not only reliance on yourself ... (but) also the need constantly to research

new means of expression.... Hence Picasso has often seemed like a man tirelessly running from himself". Very profound!! In other words (those of the Times art critic) there is - "an extraordinary unevenness, a gulf between the best and least good which is just about as wide as it could be" and, "By comparison (with other painters of the early part of the century, Malevich, Matisse, Kandinsky, Mondrian etc) Picasso seems capricious".

These sort of statements are made easily enough. A quick glance at a selection of paintings would show any idiot the difference between the sentimental Blue and Pink pictures of poverty (eg. fig 1. So popular, as Berger points out, among the very rich) and the taut, emotional distortions of the late thirties; between the calm grey/brown fragmented guitars on cheap cafe tables (fig.2) and the sensuous curving studies of Marie-Therese

(fig.5); the solid dignity of the 'classical' period (fig.3), followed immediately by the frenzied nightmares of the later twenties (fig.4). The list is endless.

Picasso's brief, if brilliant, flirtation with so many styles is traced by Berger to his extreme skill. He found little need to struggle with a subject, rarely regarded his work as a search into deeper levels, spurned any evolution, development or progression. "All I have ever made was for the present"... "to search means nothing in painting, to find is the thing". And the finding, for him, was always all too easy. As a child prodigy (a rare thing in the visual arts, which require experience for any development) he was imbued with the feeling that art was a 'visitation' ("the first vision remains intact") himself merely a medium rather than being a conscious person in control of a process. Here also we have a possible explanation of Picasso's tragic shallowness, of why his latest paintings, after a lifetime of work, remain at much the same level as his earliest ones - even if very different.

Berger isolates two periods in Picasso's work which he finds exceptional. The first of these is the Cubist period, in which the artist attained a satisfactory harmony with the 20th century. He is, Berger argues, a 'vertical invader' into 20th century, capitalist, industrial Europe from Spain - which still embraced pre-feudal elements. The phrase originates with the Spanish reactionary Ortega y Gasset, and is a version of the concept of "combined & uneven development".

Thus the Blue period, his first consistent style (1901-1904) expressed his first reactions to Paris as an industrial city; the paupers are outcasts, like himself, in a city which contains also the potential of universal wealth - unlike Spain where there was practically no industry and the most the pea-

sants could hope for - expressed in Spanish anarchism - was only a bit more land. The mood of the next, the Rose, period, is far more optimistic. But its happier mood is based on a rejection of the city. The clowns and acrobats are still outcasts, but have the calm and dignity of being vastly closer to nature (he places them in open spaces, with animals); they have the grace and self-respect of their skill, the pride of independence and timelessness.

By 1906 Picasso was in a position of both idealising the natural and primitive, and reaping the benefits of Paris sophistication. In that year the incredible ferment which started with the Impressionists in the 1860s was on the verge of yet another breakthrough. Picasso was welcomed into the teeming artistic life of Montmartre, befriended by a host of painters regrouping after the breakup of the Fauvist movement. What followed, according to Berger, was the only time in Picasso's life when he accepted the modern world; when he worked within a group with common aims; when his work developed consistently; and when he shed his inborn skill and ease. And these are all summed up in Cubism.

CUBISM - MATERIALIST AND DIALECTICAL.

Berger here makes a good case for Cubism being dialectical materialist, in a well argued section which is about the best part of the book. Its vision, he says, was to establish the physical presence of an object, the material basis of character. In portraits, the Cubists reacted against the stress on the spiritual and soulful, and set out to explore the structural arrangement of the body and make it precise and tangible. This is combined with a most organic conception of movement and change which includes the spectator, where the 'viewer is a part of the view' - hence the multiple viewpoint, the shifting planes and angles, the fragmented image. In the unity of matter and mov-

ement Cubism achieved a calm which, unlike all the conscious attempts to recapture the classical ethos, was not the calm cold silence of the grave. Nor was its naturalism kept within the bounds of mechanical reproduction of a static photographic image.

In its subject matter and its choice of materials, it was an optimistic affirmation of modernity on the threshold of the new century. It chose man-made things of urban, everyday reality -- cafe tables, chairs, newspapers and ash-trays, cheap common subjects far removed from the heroic, the ideal, the picturesque. For Picasso, far removed from the violent rejection of civilisation and its works which had immediately preceded it and is generally thought to have been its parent.

Challenging the idea of art as something permanent, precious and expensive, Picasso, Braque and their followers used 'worthless' (from the capitalist exchange point of view) bits of paper, oil-cloth, cardboard and tin in their paintings and constructions, superimposed with numbers and stencilled lettering. They mixed sand and sawdust with their paint, combined it with pencil drawing and the techniques of house-painters like 'combing' to provide the effect of wood grain. In these ways, they asserted the right of the artist to use any means he chose, and rendered valuable service to their successors.

The war once again isolated Picasso, from both the 20th century and his fellow artists. At the crossroads, he fell back on his skill. He took the line of least resistance and substituted the company and privileges of his bourgeois patrons (now numerous; as early as 1909 he employed a maid with apron and cap to wait at table) for that company of artists which the War had disbanded. For a while he 'impersonated' their cultural traditions: drawings in the style of Ingres, the

great cultural pillar of the 2nd Empire, and paintings which assume the mantle of classicism were so numerous as to earn the title of Classical Period in the catalogue of the Great Man's works. Berger charitably argues that he was challenging bourgeois monopoly to classicism, which began with their assumption of power and evolved with them from the revolutionary to the established. He did of course add his own touch throughout - most notably, perhaps, was the re-assertion of the close-to-the-earthness of his outlook. Interspersed with these were many still lifes 'in the style of' synthetic Cubism, and those trailings after the surrealists which were to become his next style, lasting into the early thirties.

WOMAN AND WAR.

One of Berger's major explanations for Picasso's periods of capriciousness and eclecticism is that he lacks a subject sufficient for his emotions. That in a society which is in a state of transition or disintegration there are no fixed and accepted subjects which carry a traditional significance, are the recognisable equivalents for specific emotions. That in this situation the artist must either choose and create subjects which will communicate emotions or experiences, or alternatively his subject will be painting itself, the act of seeing, with the object a mere vehicle for this. He asserts that Picasso is among the former (with the exception of the Cubist years) which is one reason why abstraction has never appealed to him. And that it was only in certain periods of his life that he found adequate subjects. "When Picasso has found his subjects, he has produced a number of masterpieces. When he has not, he has produced paintings which will eventually be seen to be absurd".

During 1931-43, he found subjects in his own experiences, which seemed to reach a high point of intensity; first in his affair with Marie-Therese Walter

and then in the Spanish Civil War and the occupation of Paris. And out rolled the masterpieces. Now his own situation is expressed in the powerful symbol of the minotaur - an animal in almost human form, a creature which civilisation has first inhibited and then failed to assimilate. Thrown back on his own self, his body and his sensations become his subject matter. Even actual events as specific as Guernica are seen by him in terms of his own experience, and become highly subjective. Distortions reflect actual sensations - sexual desire, pain or (during the occupation) claustrophobia.

So far, then, we have two groups of successful paintings. The Cubist years when civilisation and the 20th century seemed to offer good prospects - prospects hopelessly shattered in 1914. And the period which began when he met Marie Therese and ended when the war was approaching its end, and his capacity for acutely felt experience was on the wane. If at this point he had been able once again to look seriously to the future, instead of indulging in dreams of a primitive arcadia where time stands still, he might, according to Berger, have gone on producing masterpieces.

FAILURE OF NERVE

But where he sought to find once again both the companionship and the optimism of the Cubist years, he was disappointed and failed. In 1944 he joined the France CP, saying "I have always been an exile, now I am no longer one..... Again I am among my brothers." But instead of finding the "inspiration from those to whom he could belong" he was treated as a mascot; they used him person for prestige propaganda while dismissing his art as decadent.

Being himself a member of the CP, with a rather idealised picture of it ("It is a school of philosophy, an army, an agent of the future: at its noblest it is a fraternity" - a good description of what it should be, but alas not quite

the genuine article...) Berger's description of what happened is 'more in sorrow than in anger'. Except for a brief and fleeting hint at the whole truth, he confines his indictment of the CP to Stalin's policy on art -- which is now a sufficiently safe subject to let Barbara Niven welcome the book with open arms and call it profound. The hint, on the last page of the book, unelaborated, refers to the CP's 'failure of revolutionary nerve' in 1945. (This, says Niven, hastily passing on to his above quoted description, "is indeed a challenge"!!) He attacks the CP for failing to give Picasso the companionship and understanding he needed, ignoring the fact that what he really needed - at least if we agree with the argument up to this point - was precisely that revolutionary nerve which they lacked. What he needed, to compete with his noble savage (now rapidly taking the form of a child's doodle), was a completely new society, not just friendship within the old one.

This book is well worth its 12/6, if not a good ^{bit} more -- and one does not have to be an art historian or critic to appreciate it. While debunking the legend of Picasso, exposing the 'art-as-investment' set-up which has made him a millionaire, and sparing no strictures for his failures, Berger writes about him with warmth and sympathy. The failure is not merely some mysterious shallowness which manifests itself in some works and not in others, but basically the failure of his surroundings to inspire anything other than a desire to escape. And in escaping, he has inevitably become that which he portrayed himself as in a series of drawings in 1954 (reproduced in this book, among many other illustrations) -- an old clown, a tame pet of that civilisation which he has always tried to reject, - if not in his life, at least in his art.

R.M.M.

ILLUSTRATIONS: 1. Boy and Horse. 2. Still Life with Chair caning. 3. Seated Woman. 4. Woman in an armchair. 5. Woman in a

Red Armchair. 6. One of the 44 variations on 'Las Meninas' by Velazquez.

ELITES AND ELITISTS

Elites in Society.

T.B. Bottomore. Pelican. 3/6. 160pp.

Written by one of the few sociologists who have attempted to come to terms with Marxism, this book is exceedingly patchy and not very consistent.

The first half is taken up mainly in criticism of the elitist theories of Pareto, Mosca and James Burnham, a one time Marxist.

Pareto's elite theories were formulated in opposition to the rising working class movement in Italy. Mussolini boasted of having been a pupil of Pareto. His theories, and those of Mosca, were principally designed to show that the working class could not take power and exercise it for itself in a truly democratic fashion. History, for these apologists of the status quo, was a succession of elites and counter-elites. For them, leaders possessed some supposedly inherent psychological qualities. Social change took place, not through class struggle, but when the existing leaders had become degenerate and no longer possessed the old magical leadership qualities. Then, somehow, new elites arose to take their place!

Bottomore points out, quite correctly, that any politically ruling group must rest on a certain social basis. Therefore, to attempt to explain the dynamics of society in terms of leaders in isolation from the changes in the forces and relations of production is futile. Capitalism does not possess a completely homogenous ruling class and the bureaucracies which it sets up to execute its requirements do have a certain independent development. However, this does not mean that any political group or bureaucracy can exercise power

for itself. There is an organic relationship between the members of the bureaucracies and the economically dominant class in society. Higher members of the civil service, the army and the police force come from the higher echelons of the bourgeoisie, and have been conditioned and educated accordingly -- apart from their direct interest in the maintenance of the capitalist system.

Bottomore is equally scathing about the managerial theories, as exemplified by Burnham. As he indicates, these are an offshoot of the earlier elitist theories. According to Burnham, since the rise of the Joint Stock Cos. the industrial managers take on an ever more important position in the running of the economy, so much so that the owners of the individual enterprises become superfluous. Hence, the managers will take over and become the masters of a new, supposedly non-capitalist, type of society.

However, as Bottomore points out, the managers are not homogenous enough to constitute a group sufficiently cohesive to take power. Secondly, the managers themselves arise very much from the ruling, ie the owners of the means of production -- and hence their way of life and consciousness is in consonance with that of the ruling class; thirdly, apart from the exorbitant salaries paid out to industrial managers by the ruling class, it is simply not true that the managers have no economic interests in the capitalist system. In fact, to stabilise their positions, the managers of large enterprises are very often forced to acquire financial interests. Without these, they can be and are frequently removed. International finance is still sovereign, and dominates the economic life of all capitalist countries independently of the individual wishes or desires of managers, capitalists or politicians.

Fourthly, in just the same way that any politically ruling group must have a

social, ie a class, base so must managers. Power stripped of its class content is nothing. The main question is -- for whom do the managers exercise power? It does not take much looking to see that they exercise it on behalf of the owners of capital, whose only criterion is pure and simple profit. The managers are thus psychologically and economically dependent on their capitalist masters.

However, having successfully demolished the elitist theories and their offshoots, Bottomore adopts exactly the same approach to social developments in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, eg. on p.93 he has this to say:-

"At the same time, the need for outstanding leaders and elites is most keenly felt by the population wherever complex and difficult social changes are taking place and the familiar ways of life are disappearing. In the present-day developing countries, therefore, we have an excellent opportunity to examine the social forces which are creating new elites, as well as the activities of the elites themselves in the attempted transformation of their societies into modern economically advanced nations."

The fault here is not the acceptance of elites as necessary; given backward conditions Marxists see this as inevitable in the long run. What is wrong is that he sees these societies in isolation. He cannot see the potential of proletarian rule in backward countries, and the world nature of the proletarian revolution which would allow the high level of the advanced countries to alleviate the conditions that generate new elites in the backward countries. Their dependence on the world market is well appreciated by Bottomore, but he does not draw the obvious conclusion that this grip can only be relinquished and true co-operation established with the achievement of socialism in the advanced countries.

In assessing elites that have developed and are developing, he fails to see the 'roots' in the vacuum arising out of the default of the proletariat and its pseudo revolutionary parties -- the CPs. Equally he ignores the extreme limitations which the world capitalist economy places on the future growth of these new elites, which are spawns of Imperialism. The progressive role of elites in history ended when society on a world scale became ripe for socialism. As an academic sociologist all Bottomore can do is worship the accomplished fact of bureaucracy and elites and hope for some solution from them. But the problems that face humanity at the moment can only be solved by the clash of living forces in the building of proletarian internationalist parties of a Bolshevik kind.

P.S.

O'CASEY PACKAGE

The World of Sean O'Casey.

Ed. by Sean Mac Cann. Four Square. 5/-.
251pp

This is a loose collection of reminiscences and essays, curiously like a T.V. profile. Serious research side by side with man-in-the-street type opinion which ranges from actors of O'Casey roles to spiteful distant relatives. Surprisingly the result not only gives us a picture of O'Casey himself -- despite contradictions -- but also shows us his environment and how he appeared to a wide selection of people.

T.P. Coogan has an essay on the "Exile", mealy-mouthed but perceptive in patches; David Krause shows us Sean at the end, on the margin of blindness, declaiming Keats; an item "The Great Occasions" touches on the political background to the reception of the early plays in Dublin.

The essay The Early Years is perhaps the most interesting. It proves to the satisfaction of a non-expert that the

Legend of O'Casey "the slum dramatist" was no more than that, despite the efforts made by himself to 'wear the badge proudly and pin a coloured ribbon or two on it'. Originating as genteel middle class, his experience of the absolute poverty of the Dublin labourer seems to have been brief. But his experiences then, under the tutelage of the lockout, police truncheons and Larkin's great message of labour solidarity -- a blow against one is a blow against all -- marked him for life. It emerges that the 'Autobiographies' are not too factual; which was already clear from the fantasies of this truly Joycean work of art. But their value is not as particular records but as a re-creation of the substance of the life of the Dublin masses. So what if O'Casey projected himself imaginatively into this; what if he did depict the degradation that festered in Dublin, dramatising material from his own life? This does not mar the power of his work for those who recognise the Autobiographies as one of the most vivid crystallisations of working class experience, capable, for workers who find a way to them, of clarifying their own experiences. Also let it be said that admirers of these books have always had to be selective; because side by side with such chapters as the one on 1913, Prometheus Hibernicus, is the degrading bilge of 'Rebel Orwell'.

M.D.



One of the drawings by John Cullen Murphy from "The World of Sean O'Casey".

M A R X I S M I N A M E R I C A

Marxist essays in American History.
Introduction by George Novack.
Merit Publishers. 14/-

of the blackest reaction. The pages of their theoretical magazines under its different names (New International - Fourth International - and now International Socialist Review) have been a source of enlightenment and Marxist education for individuals and groups far beyond the shores of America; back numbers of these magazines are an arsenal for revolutionaries, but are unfortunately rare. Now a sizeable selection of essays from them has been assembled, including -- The Conquest of the Indians; Tom Paine - Revolutionist; Negro slavery in North America, and two dozen more. An opportunity that shouldn't be missed. J.C.

For more than three decades the publications of the American Trotskyist group, the Socialist Workers Party, have had the task of preserving and attempting to develop the heritage of revolutionary ideas, in an era

FILMS

WHOSE WAR IS OVER ?

THE WAR IS OVER

Director: Alain Resnais; Photography: Phillipe Brun; with Yves Montand, Ingrid Thulin, Genevieve Bujold.

Diego is a pessimistic revolutionary, worn down by a weary unending existence of false passports, aliases, illegal border crossings, knocking on strange doors, passwords, an existence which has long become for him mundane and banal. For just as long he has been convinced that he'll die an exile, that "those who are doing anything in Spain are 20 years old", that arrests mean -- well, in France prison or a fine; in Spain... everyone knows. And that these damn tourists aren't exactly helping the situation. But back in Paris his chiefs, growing past middle-age, indulge in wishful thinking and lose comrades to the police.

Arrests in Madrid? That only means that the police are afraid, we're about to win through - full steam ahead, call a general strike, let Juan go on to Madrid to organise it; Diego's reports of police round-ups are exaggerated, no doubt his last six months there have made him subjective, he can't see the wood for the trees ... he should take a rest.

Diego's gloom, his partial retreat to a concern for preservation of life, is counterposed to the dream world of his superiors, their dangerous adventurism, their personal callousness. Our sympathies are made to lie full and square

with Diego - and though the artistic dice are loaded in his favour, I would feel reluctant to disagree.

He is a man who continues in a routine, entangled in a web of relationships which are the substance of his reality: with these he feels no conflict. But he no longer finds the ideas of 'The Organisation' adequate to explain reality, much less a guide to action; his frustration and disenchantment, perhaps even his tiredness, are fixed by the dead weight of the myths of the Organisation -- myths which cost a heavy overhead in the loss of people, and of effectiveness in the fight. The tension is between Diego's commitment to the Revolution and his divorcement from the illusions and mythology of his leaders, which have evaporated for him in the heat of the struggle. Essentially it is a tragic situation, and on this level the film is an accurate register of the experiences of many, many militants.

Using techniques which in films like "Last year in Marienbad" made for extreme formalism, Resnais here lays bare to us a whole situation and a man's state of mind. We are placed in the middle of a moment of time which is not the beginning of the story but merely a convenient point to begin relating it. This moment of time contains both the

marks of past time - which it in turn qualifies - and the seeds of future time. We come to know Diego by seeing what he sees; simply by the insertion of flashing, brief visual equivalents of his mental processes, we know that it is no arbitrary dramatic turn that sends him back to Spain and near-certain arrest, away from his beautiful and sympathetic Mariann; nor his own under-statement that he would miss the place. But a whole complex of human feelings, haunting images of faces, comrades arrested, Carmen's face when he told her of Andres' arrest, the thought of Ramon, born in exile and spending his life fixing false bottoms on cars, dying suddenly before he could even see Spain. We enter into his world.

In doing this we are made to take a subjective view ourselves, and are laid open to this cunningly illusionistic super-realism; realism heightened yet further by the casting, and the positively sensuous texture of the relationships, producing a depth and dimension which, allied with the stream of consciousness technique of Resnais draws us into the taste and feel of the situation. The closeness of the road to our own experiences, the truth of the film to states of mind, to behaviour and personality, inclines us to take its implications about the objective situation (never stated dogmatically but nevertheless there) as equally true and real. Which they are not.

To take one example: he comes into contact with a group of French students, who want to use terrorism against the tourists in Spain to "create a revolutionary situation". We are given to understand that these are the 20-year olds wielding their more effective weapon. And this is made easier to swallow, because the students as types are so realistically drawn -- sleek, fresh-faced, petit bourgeois, regarding Diego with a mixture of awe ("a professional") and contempt ("are you afraid of plastic?"). He in turn is attracted by their criticism of his own organisation,

which he feebly defends, and repelled by their hysteria.

Again not stated but implied, is the political allegiance of the protagonists. The youngsters are presumably Maoists (calling themselves Leninist Revolutionists); the older characters, Diego's organisation, can be none other than the CP. Therefore, it is conveniently ignored (or concealed) that in reality this organisation is not at all revolutionary -- but the abortionist of revolutions playing with fairy-tales of a peaceful road for Spain. And for those who resist the realism, and do not fall for the implication of the effectiveness of the young terrorists, the confrontation of Diego and the Maoists is that of twin caricatures.

That the very real demoralisation and pessimism of types like Diego is ^{the} direct result of his Party's performance in 1937 - and since - is also ignored. Not only the tourist trade has confined the Spanish exiles to 20 years' grind in a barren field of work: other fields have offered a rich harvest which could have transformed that one -- but the ground has been well and truly poisoned time after time by international stalinism.

These comments inevitably come to mind, but I don't intend to direct them against this film. Resnais has every right to make a film that does not concern itself with a factual picture of the objective world, and within these terms of reference he has made as sympathetic and sensitive a film as one could hope ^{for} of great richness and complexity, and that is a pretty rare thing. Where the objective world is hinted at, implied, in such a way as to distort it, we also have a right to comment, and hope that we don't seem to be philistines, trampling on Resnais' artistic licence. Meanwhile, we wait for a film which says, for the revolutionaries: "The war is not over - not until we've won!"

SOVIET VIEW OF
FASCISM

"COMMON FASCISM" was among a batch of recent Soviet films pushing around the circuits, another Third Reich documentary. Being barred from a Marxist political analysis, the makers in their commentary and their 'related material' attempted a 'psychological' explanation of the phenomenon; which, entirely unrelated to any materialist conception, inevitably came over as pretty thin and heavily laboured.

The general emphasis was on the personality cult ... which as we know is not entirely confined to fascism! One would think that with ample experience of the beast themselves they would not find it quite so funny; but one would be wrong: Hitler practising in front of a mirror, Mussolini making fantastic faces at a rally, the making of a special 1,000 year calf leather edition of Mein Kampf -- all provide a rich source of mirth. Of course they're right to bring such people down to their proper size,

to their truly ludicrous personal insignificance. But without showing their social basis the result is puzzling and inconclusive.

In contrast to the single personality, they show the MASS. Acting, thinking, following, laughing, singing. These two would seem to explain each other. But really, they tell us many many times, people are individuals. They demonstrate this intriguing thesis with candid shots of Muscovites, and children, who are GOOD.

It would be too embarrassing to dwell on, but in passing they say, in their best United Front voice, there was another Germany. And I'm thankful that they found the space to include some shots taken of the Communist Militia's last march through Berlin. Silent, subdued, defiant, well aware of their coming fate. Watched by a silent, fearful crowd, in which one white-haired woman dares to raise a clinched fist in solidarity. Yes, there was another Germany..... And other communists, too.

GRACCHIA

I.W.G. LITERATURE.

<u>Notes from Mountjoy:</u>	Liam Mellows	1/-
<u>Wolfe Tone</u>		6d.
<u>A History of Ireland (unfinished) by Frederick Engels</u> (English translation by A.Clifford)		2/-
<u>The Irish Revolt 1916 and After</u>	Sean Murray	1/-
<u>IRISH MILITANT</u> , monthly printed paper.		6d.

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