People on the left in Greece are beginning to believe that a united and electorally empowered left, and a left-wing government, can be the initiator of a popular pro-working-class exit from the crisis.
But there are many political problems along the way.
In the last two polls the combined percentage of what is reckoned as the left (Democratic Left, Syriza, KKE, Greens, Antarsya) was above 30%. The combined percentage of Pasok and the conservative New Democracy party (ND) were below 40%.
But three main left wing forces — KKE, Syriza and Democratic Left — have come up with three diametrically different responses.
KKE is vehemently rejects not only all calls for electoral unity but even minimal cooperation and coordination on the left.
KKE rejects even a united front to confront racism and fascism, and a time when ultra-right chauvinistic, racist and openly neo-Nazi forces are gaining momentum.
In contrast, Syriza incorporates within itself forces with very different stances on the euro and the eurozone, on the debt, on the character of parliamentary democracy and the necessity of a workers’ anti-capitalist revolution — 13 groups, from ex-Eurocommunist reformists through Maoists to Trotskyists.
Its largest section, Synaspismos (the ex-Eurocommunists), is still stuck with its utopian Euro-Keynesian response to the crisis — Eurobonds, Euro-financed productive investment, and progressive democratisation of the European Union and eurozone.
Since becoming synonymous with the youth protests in 2008, Syriza has oscillated between a militant youth section and a political leadership, coming from Synaspismos, which aims for a human centered capitalism.
Until recently Syriza refused to call for nationalisation of the banks under workers’ control. Instead it supported “monitoring and controlling the banking system”. Instead of refusing to pay the Greek debt, Syriza asks for renegotiation, postponement and freezing of debt payment, the creation of Eurobonds, etc.
Syriza aims for an electoral alliance, as broad as possible, which will record the anti-cuts sentiments of the population in a very loose way.
Despite the fact that the 6 May election takes place after 16 general strikes and amidst ongoing industrial strikes and unrest, Syriza’s electoral manifesto does not mention the words struggle or movement.
Less than three years ago, in its 2009 manifesto, Syriza stated that it was “going to utilize its increased electoral appeal to make more politically effective its support to the evolving social struggles”. Today’s Syriza manifesto is centred around a formation of a government “of a new social and political majority with the radical left at its centre”.
“Give us a vote for power, give us a vote to govern Greece”, said Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras in a pre-election meeting, explaining that “Syriza knows what it is doing. It has capable members and leaders with scientific knowledge, political experience, and resilience”. The role that the leaders of Syriza allocate to its supporters is that of passive supporters.
Tsipras has repeatedly stated that Syriza is not only a “negative” force of denunciations and resistance, but a force with a left-wing proposal to govern Greece in the “here and now”.
Syriza states that it is aiming for a government with the left at its centre and other progressive forces. It has formed an electoral coalition with disillusioned MPs from Pasok, some of whom left Pasok from the onset of the cuts but some of whom voted at least for the first cuts memorandum.
Tsipras argues that a left-wing anti-memorandum government should be in a position to demand the end to austerity measures from the EU/ ECB/ IMF Troika and the initiation of an era of development without being expelled from the eurozone, because it would contradict the strategic interests of the eurozone to expel member states.
He has stated that he is prepared to be prime minister on 7 May. In a desperate attempt to build bridges to the KKE he stated that he does not exclude the possibility of KKE secretary Aleka Papariga being prime minister.
Tsipras has been calling for various forms of electoral alliance to both KKE and Democratic Left, from a comprehensive electoral common front to tactical electoral cooperation.
However, a united front of any form between KKE, Democratic Left and Syriza is politically impossible because the three parties disagree on the eurozone and euro and many other issues.
Democratic Left split away from Syriza in 2010. It points to the potential of cooperating with sections of Pasok and ND in favour of a slower, smoother enforcement of the second memorandum, and has vehemently oppose the calls for a left united front from Syriza. It declares it will refuse to cooperate with irresponsible and extreme forces that will pull Greece out of the eurozone. Its electoral priorities are: Securing Greece’s position within the Eurozone; Revitalise the economy, Increase the morale of society and deal with corruption and scandals.
Democratic Left voted against the second cuts memorandum, but now it commits to honouring that memorandum and any agreements signed with “our social partners” (Merkozy, ECB, IMF). It differentiates from Pasok and ND in “fighting for alterations and adjustments and re-opening negotiations with our social partners within the already-agreed memorandum framework”.
Both Pasok and ND, in the electoral campaign, talk about modifying the memorandum. But Democratic Left leader Kouvelis emphasises that he does not demand “a total and comprehensive renegotiation of the memorandum” but only for piecemeal changes and adjustments in stages “provided that there are important political changes within the German-French axis or our fiscal measures improve significantly”.
Democratic Left not only did not participate in the student movement and the “indignant citizens’” movement in the city squares, but opposed them. It vehemently opposed George Papandreou’s call for a referendum on the 26 of October cuts agreement.
Tsipras has also declared that he is prepared to accept a “vote of confidence” from Panos Kamenos and the Independent Greeks, an ultra-right, nationalistic-chauvinistic, but supposedly anti-memorandum split from ND. Kamenos party, which is polling around 8%, is a product of ND’s u-turn from its supposedly anti-memorandum stance and, to a lesser extent, the deterioration of the electoral appeal of the previously dominant right-populist force, LAOS.
Kamenos made a long political career within ND and had an active political role in all the ND leaderships and governments from Mitsotakis through to Samaras. In the ND leadership contest at the end of 2009, Kamenos supported the ultra-neo-liberal and ultra-pro-memorandum and pro-USA Dora Bakogianni against Samaras.
Kamenos pretends to “fight against the establishment”, but he has formed a party staffed with spoiled rich kids. The daughter of the leader of the “Pro Royal National Organisation of Greece” is a prominent member of his party.
In Tsipras’s theoretical scenario of Syriza needing Kamenos’s votes in order to form a “government of the left”, Kamenos would not hand over those votes without political preconditions. And those would probably be for Syriza’s “government of the left” not to attack the capitalists, the employers, the bankers, the businessmen, and the shipowners whose class interest Kamenos represents; not to nationalise the banks and big business; not to reverse the privatisations of the public sector; not to rebuild the welfare state and provisions; not to tax the rich. Kamenos would demand that Syriza comply with his racist anti-immigration policy and his nationalistic policy against the Turkish minority in Thrace.
For a formation of a robust political united front of the left a “minimal” programmatic agreement should be reached based upon at least three preconditions.
The first precondition is that the left give answers on the reasons for the current crisis. It should be agreed that the current crisis is a systemic, endemic crisis of the global capitalist system, and not a Greek crisis or a debt crisis or a golden boys’ crisis, or a matter of blunders by the “neoliberal forces”. The “minimal” programme must be of an anti-capitalist and socialist character.
The second criterion should be the stance on the debt. The debt is a class weapon of the ruling class. It was created because the state’s revenues were eaten away due to the state-protected tax evasion of the rich and the state bailouts handed out to bankrupt companies and banks Our answer should be: not a penny for the creditors.
The third criterion is that the left wing anti-capitalist proposal should not be “another stage” towards the struggle against capitalism and for socialism. It should be the occupation of a strategic position of the enemy during a class war which leads towards a truly democratic accountable radical socialist society.
A programme of transitional demands is of paramount importance as it guides us in the immediate demands that we fight for, and also points to the need to change the way that society is organised. It links the struggles of today with the world that we are trying to build in the future.
