Benghazi, which consolidated itself early for the rebellion in the midst of violent tension and with astonishing speed, is already the power base of the Libyan Interim Government.
Since the uprising began on 15 February, the territorial gains of the revolution have been huge. The use of mercenaries has been overplayed in the media, however: the regime still has many supporters.
Qadaffi’s son has alleged that the uprising is Islamist. Certainly the demonstrations in Libya in February 2006 against the Jylland-Posten cartoons, also directed against the secular nature of the regime, had an Islamist component.
However, the transitional government in Benghazi looks very little like an Islamist Emirate. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya is essentially monarchist in orientation. The Senoussi pretenders to the throne, deposed in 1969, still have widespread support in the country and will be a major player in the future form of government – at least in initial negotiations. They have indicated over the last few days that they will be returning to the country to argue for a constitutional monarchy.
Qadaffi has fought a low level war against Islamist militias since the mid 1980s, and the prison massacres in the early 90s were largely directed against the Islamists. There have been several gun battles with Islamic militants in the cities over recent years.
The central Islamist grouping seems to be the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), long linked to the GIA in Algeria, although it has publicly severed ties with Bin Laden and global Salafism in favour of a more locally rooted, less global concept of a Libyan Khalifate.
The fluidity of the Libyan borders has traditionally helped militias such as the LIFG to operate, and their ranks are strengthened by elements who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. Profoundly influenced by classical Salafist clerics from Saudi Arabia who went into exile in North Africa in the 70s and 80s, the group is very hostile to the Libyan tribal structures that supported the Qadaffi regime and to the Senoussi pretenders, who were among the backers for anti-Islamist Sufism in the Maghreb.
The visions of these rival blocs or estates vying for power will be sustained by their respective access to military power and the rival army factions will be the arbiter of government once the regime falls.
But the army factions will also be taking the measure of the working people of Libya who ignited the rebellion in the first place and will not sanction yet another despotic regime.
Libyan living standards have been high for North Africa — a small population in an oil-rich territory. An unusual feature of the regime has been the levels of migrant workers in the region — everything from British and American oil workers, through Russian advisers, Filipino and Sudanese labourers, to pressganged central African mercenaries from Chad and Niger.
The significant Palestinian diaspora in Libya has been treated dreadfully throughout the history of the regime, and simultaneously used as a whip to beat Israel.
The deaths of the rebels killed by Qadaffi will not be in vain if they signal the sending of the Libyan despotism to the shitheap of history. Let the Libyan revolution be the third of thirty revolutions!
